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INTRODUCTION

As America continues to experience its current economic
downturn, mortgage foreclosures are increasing with alarming
frequency.' New Jersey, the nation's fastest growing real estate
I See, e.g., Joseph F. Sullivan, New Boom Hits Suburbs: Evictions and Foreclosures,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1991, at B5 (explaining that during the first nine months of
1990, mortgage foreclosure rates had increased in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania). The author illustrated the magnitude of this problem by
comparing each state's foreclosure rate with the total number of outstanding mortgages in each state. Id. In New Jersey, foreclosures accounted for 1.11% of the
state's outstanding mortgages, up from .80% in 1989. Id. New York's rate stood at
.69%, up from .54% the year before. Id. Connecticut's foreclosures accounted for
.71% of its outstanding mortgages, up from .27% the previous year. Id. Despite
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market during the 1980s, is experiencing the foreclosure phenomenon in a most profound manner.' Ironically, New Jersey's
tenants, who ordinarily have nothing to do with negotiating or
defaulting on a mortgage, must take cognizance of this recent
trend.3 If a tenant's landlord defaults on a mortgage secured by
the tenant's leasehold residence,
the mortgagee may, upon fore4
closure, evict the tenant.
The current rash of foreclosures in New Jersey has resulted
in a dramatic increase in the number of foreclosure-related tenant evictions.5 These evictions persist despite the existence of
state anti-eviction legislation.6 The New Jersey Supreme Court
New Jersey's high percentage of foreclosures, the author observed that the state
was second to Pennsylvania, which posted a 1.21% rate for the first nine months of
1990. Id.; see also, Thomas J. Lueck, Mortgage Delinquencies Increasing, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1990, § 10 (Real Estate), at 1 (pointing out that the real estate slump in the
northeastern region of the United States had not yet reached the level of delinquent mortgage payments and mortgage foreclosures experienced in America's
southwestern region, where "more than 20 percent of the mortgage loans are delinquent and over 20,000 homes are being sold off by the Federal Government").
2 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at BI (explaining that New Jersey has suffered the
largest increases in mortgage foreclosures in the New York metropolitan area); see
also Hanna W. Rosin, Tenants'Suit Seeks End To ForeclosureEvictions, 132 N.J. L.J. 588,
613 (1992) (explaining that final judgments on foreclosures in New Jersey increased during the first three quarters of 1992 to 13,016, up from a 6115 total for
1991). In 1991, 24,000 foreclosure complaints were filed in the NewJersey Superior Court, up dramatically by 295% over 1988's rate of filing of 8182 complaints.
Id.
3 See Henry Gottlieb, Tenants Challenge Forecloser's Power To Evict Them, 130 N.J.
L.J. 1284 (1992) (explaining that tenants may face eviction from their leased homes
upon foreclosure by the landlord's mortgagee because there had been no definitive
ruling on the scope of an amendment to NewJersey's Anti-Eviction Act to preclude
mortgagees from evicting tenants absent good cause). But see Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619 A.2d 241, 247 (App. Div.
1993) (ruling that the amended Anti-Eviction Act did not apply to foreclosing mortgagees), certif granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
4 See Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 623, 428 A.2d
1289, 1292 (1981) (ruling that foreclosing mortgagees were not subject to the New
Jersey Anti-Eviction Act, and therefore need not establish good cause before evicting a defaulting mortgagor's tenants at foreclosure). Cf Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch.
138, § 7, (Anti-Eviction Act) 41 (West) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3
(West 1952 & Supp. 1987)) (expanding the scope of the Anti-Eviction Act to require not only landlords or owners, but also their successors in ownership or possession, to establish good cause before evicting residential tenants). This
amendment appears to include foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's good cause
restrictions on evicting residential tenants. See id. Despite this appearance, New
Jersey's judiciary has recently ruled that the amended Act did not apply to foreclosing mortgagees. Chase Manhattan Bank, 261 N.J. Super. at 439-40, 619 A.2d at 247.
5 See Rosin, supra note 2, at 588 (explaining that foreclosure-related evictions in
Essex County, New Jersey, reached 200 in 1991, up from 87 in 1988 and "almost
none the previous year").
6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). Popularly re-
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has held that the Anti-Eviction Act governs traditional landlordtenant relations only. 7 As a result, foreclosing mortgagees have
retained their common law right 8 to evict a defaulting mortgagor's tenants. 9
ferred to as New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act, this legislation limits the grounds for
evicting a tenant from a residential dwelling to thirteen "good cause" grounds
specified by the statute. Id. See infra note 64 (setting forth the pertinent text of the
statute as it appeared, unamended, in 1974).
7 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. The court ruled that the AntiEviction Act applied to landlord-tenant relationships only and therefore permitted
the foreclosing mortgagee to evict the defaulting landlord's tenants. Id.
8 See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text (explaining mortgagees' common
law rights with respect to obtaining possession of premises that have been leased by
a defaulting mortgagor).
9 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. Tenants are placed in a most
precarious position if evicted by the mortgagee. See Charles C. Cornelio, The Effect
Of Anti-Eviction Statutes On Foreclosing Mortgagees, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 361, 361
(1985) (explaining that NewJersey, like many other large urban centers, must grapple with the problem of maintaining an adequate supply of rental housing for its
citizens); Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need To Recognize A Right To Counsel
For Indigent Defendants In Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 559
(1988) (explaining that evicted tenants face not only the trauma of being forced to
move, but also a housing market that offers few chances to find a new place to live).
This problem assumes new dimensions when one considers the well-documented emotional and psychological burdens associated with forced removal from
a residential dwelling. See generally Deborah H. Bell, Providing Security Of Tenure For
Residential Tenants: Good Faith As A Limitation On The Landlord's Right To Terminate, 19
GA. L. REV. 483, 483, 484 (1985) (advocating a contract-based good faith requirement for landlords who seek to terminate a tenancy, the author notes some of the
psychological and emotional side-effects of forced removal from a residential dwelling); Blair C. Stone, Comment, Community, Home, And The Residential Tenant, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 627, 627 (1986) (explaining that security in housing is conducive to the
development of one's identity). The problems associated with forced removal from
one's residence are magnified when a tenant is elderly or infirm; with no place else
to go, the most vulnerable class of citizens of any state may be forced to the streets.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.23 (West 1987) (Legislative Findings and Declarations) (acknowledging the tremendous burden that the elderly face when evicted
from their homes). The New Jersey Legislature's enactment stated in pertinent
part:
The Legislature finds that research studies have demonstrated that
the forced eviction and relocation of elderly persons from their established homes and communities harm the mental and physical health
of these senior citizens, and that these disruptions in the lives of older
persons affect adversely the social, economic and cultural characteristics of communities of the State, and increase the costs borne by all
State citizens in providing for their public health, safety and welfare
The Legislature, therefore, declares that it is in the public interest of
the State to avoid the forced eviction and relocation of senior citizen
tenants wherever possible, specifically in those instances where rental
housing market conditions and particular financial circumstances
combine to diminish the ability of senior citizens to obtain satisfactory
comparable housing within their established communities, and where
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Nevertheless, an amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction
Act has broadened the Act's scope to include not only landlords
or owners, but also their successors in ownership or possession
within the Act's good cause restraints on eviction.' ° Although a
recent appellate division decision refused to apply the amended
Act to foreclosure-related evictions," an analysis of the amendment's language and operational effect suggests that the New
Jersey Legislature intended to include foreclosing mortgagees
within the amended Act's good cause restraints.' 2 Such an interthe eviction action is the result not of any failure of the senior citizen
tenant to abide by the terms of a lease or rental agreement, but of the
owner's decision advantageously to dispose of residential property
through the device of conversion to a condominium or cooperative.
Id. For the full text of the legislation created in New Jersey to protect elderly tenants, see the Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:18-61.22 to -.39 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
10 Compare Act ofJune 25, 1974, ch. 49, § 4, 1974 NewJersey Laws 122 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987)) (setting forth the original, unamended version of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1952): "[n]o
landlord may evict or fail to renew any lease or any premises covered by section 2
of [the Anti-Eviction Act] except for good cause as defined [by the Act].") with Act
of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West) ((amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987) (stating that "[a] person who
was a tenant of a landlord in premises covered by section 2 [of the 1974 AntiEviction Act] may not be removed by any order or judgment for possession from
the premises by the owner's or landlord'ssuccessor in ownership or possession ....
) (emphasis added).
I' Chase Manhattan Bank v.Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 435, 619 A.2d 241,
245 (App. Div. 1993), certif. granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
12 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West)
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987)). See supra
note 10 for the relevant text of the amendment. Prior to the Chase Manhattan Bank
decision, courts interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 as amended, reached
contradictory results. Compare Mortgage Services of America v. Santos, No. F10951-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div., Passaic County, July 20, 1990) (holding foreclosing mortgagee subject to the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints under
the amended § 2A:18-61.3) with Chase Manhattan v. Werner, No. F-9477-89 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Essex County, Jan. 24, 1992) (holding that foreclosing bank could evict
tenants despite argument that the amended version of § 2A:18-61.3 prohibited
such eviction absent good cause).
This confusion has been caused by the Guttenberg court's double-edged reasoning in ruling that the unamended Anti-Eviction Act applied to traditional landlordtenant relations only. See generally Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85
N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289 (1981). The Guttenberg court refused to apply the AntiEviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees because the court found that the Act's language targeted only landlord-tenant relationships. Id. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292.
Furthermore, the court held that, if the legislature intended to modify foreclosing
mortgagees' well-settled common law rights, the legislature would have done so in
"some straightforward manner." Id. at 626-27, 428 A.2d at 1294-95 (citations
omitted). Unfortunately, by expanding the Anti-Eviction Act's scope beyond landlord-tenant relationships to include "successors in ownership or possession," while
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pretation of the amended Act would not only comport with the
legislative intent manifested in the Act,13 but would also harmonize with results in other jurisdictions construing similar antieviction legislation.' 4
failing to explicitly modify mortgagees' common law rights to evict defaulting mortgagor-landlords' tenants, the New Jersey State Legislature has addressed only one
of the Guttenberg court's concerns. See supra note 10 (comparing the amended version of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987) with the original, unamended
version of the legislation). Cf Chase Manhattan Bank, 261 N.J. at 439-40, 619 A.2d
at 247 (finding the Legislature's failure to explicitly identify foreclosing mortgagees
as falling within the amended Act's good cause restraints on eviction to be dispositive of a legislative intent to exclude mortgagees from the Act's scope).
The amendment's open-ended language may have been the result of the legislature's apprehension that specifically targeting one class of potential evictors
would lead to a strict judicial interpretation of the Act, although the Act was intended to provide the broadest possible protection for residential tenants against
unfair evictions. See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 9, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 42
(West) (directing that the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act "shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof."). Moreover, the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act specifically reaffirms the common law notion that,
upon foreclosure, leases in existence between the mortgagor-landlord and his tenants are extinguished. See id at 41, § 7 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3
(West 1952 & Supp. 1987)) (noting that the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction
Act will not affect the common law rule that one who is not bound by a landlord's
prior lease with a tenant and who may offer the tenant a new lease). This provision
implies that the legislature was cognizant of mortgagees' common law property
rights when the amendment was drafted, and that the legislature intended to preserve mortgagees' rights to maintain their security interests in the property, i.e.,
through renegotiating potentially damaging leases, while modifying mortgagees'
rights to take possession of the mortgaged premises. See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 637,
428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (explaining the common law concept
that a lease entered into after a mortgage has been executed was subordinate to the
mortgage and that foreclosure extinguished the tenancy creating a "periodic tenancy" between the mortgagee and tenant). Justice Pashman also asserted, however,
that residential tenants' right to possession would remain unaffected unless good
cause was established pursuant to the Anti-Eviction Act. See id.
13 The purpose of the Anti-Eviction Act was described in the Legislature's Statement attached to Assembly Bill 1586, Pub. L. 1974, ch. 49:
At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential
tenants frequently have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from
housing quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they
have not caused any problems. This is a serious matter, particularly
now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing space in New
Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to
tenants when an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord.
See Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 164, 342 A.2d 886, 889 (Law Div. 1975),
overruled in part by Puttrich v. Smith, 170 N.J. Super. 572, 407 A.2d 842 (App. Div.
1979) (setting forth the text of the statement, the court explained that this part of
the legislative history of the Act was not included in NewJersey Statutes Annotated).
14 See, e.g., Gross v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288-90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (stating that a foreclosure purchaser "became a 'landlord' by operation of
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Despite this interpretative possibility, it is also important to
recognize mortgagees' traditional common law rights and sound
business concerns when determining the Anti-Eviction Act's applicability to foreclosure-related evictions. 15 Without sufficient
justifications for limiting mortgagees' rights or protection for
mortgagees' security interests in mortgaged property, the Act
may unfairly and unconstitutionally favor tenants.' 6 Therefore,
although anti-eviction restrictions may appear to include mortgalaw" and therefore was subject to statutory eviction restrictions); Administrator of
Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1169-70 (D.C. 1985) (per curiam)
(interpreting anti-eviction laws by examining the "ordinary usage and purposes of
the statute," and holding that a mortgage insurer was subject to the anti-eviction
legislation and could not evict tenants, upon foreclosure, absent good cause).
15 See Harold N. Hensel, Note, New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act Prohibits Removal of
Residential Tenants by Foreclosing Mortgagee Upon Default of Landlord Mortgagor Absent
"Good Cause, " 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 311, 323-39 (1980) (criticizing the appellate
division's holding in Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Rivera, that foreclosing
mortgagees were subject to the good cause restraints of the Anti-Eviction Act).
The author explained that prohibiting tenant removal absent good cause despite a
prior recorded mortgage created an irreconcilable conflict between the Anti-Eviction Act and New Jersey's Recording Act. Id. at 327; see also Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at
631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297 (expressing fear that the imposition of the Anti-Eviction
Act's good cause restraints upon foreclosing mortgagees may result in a drying up
of mortgage funds in New Jersey for mortgages on residential apartments).
16 See Hensel, supra note 15, at 325 (warning that allowing tenants to remain in
possession after foreclosure could lower the value of the property and "prejudice"
the mortgagee). NewJersey's courts have noted that "[p]rivate property rights are
always subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power, where the
protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people are concerned."
Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 572, 342 A.2d 529, 532 (App. Div.
1975) (citations omitted). Whether the Anti-Eviction Act operates as a "reasonable
exercise" of the state's police power has, in certain circumstances, been difficult for
New Jersey's courts to determine. Compare Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. at 176-77, 342
A.2d at 896 (stating that application of the Anti-Eviction Act to prevent a purchaser
from occupying one of the building's units would be an unconstitutional taking
without compensation) with Puttrich v. Smith, 170 N.J. Super. 572, 575-76, 407
A.2d 842, 844 (App. Div. 1979) (overruling Sabato, the court explained that Sabato's
apparent concern with depriving a landlord of "most of his interest in the subject
matter" was unwarranted because the Anti-Eviction Act exempted premises of
more than two residential units from its coverage, thereby failing to deprive a landlord of "most of his interest" in the premises).
Although Sabato was overruled by Puttrich, the New Jersey Legislature heeded
the Sabato ruling and amended the Anti-Eviction Act in 1975 to insure that an
owner of three residential units or less, who is seeking to occupy personally one of
the units, could exercise this possessory right without conforming to the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause requirements. See Act of Feb. 19, 1976, ch. 311, 1975 New
Jersey Laws 1236 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1952 & Supp.
1987)) (adding to the original Anti-Eviction Act, this section provided good cause
for eviction where: "[tIhe owner of a building of three residential units or less seeks
to personally occupy a unit .... ); see also Cabrera v. Mordan, 220 N.J. Super. 373,
378, 532 A.2d 272, 274 (Law Div. 1987) (explaining the legislative history of the
amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act precipitated by the Sabato court's concerns),
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gees, closer examination reveals that the resolution of this issue
requires a delicate balancing of the mortgagees' and tenants' respective rights. 7
Attempting to formulate solutions to this obvious dilemma is
problematic.' 8 Where courts must balance firmly embedded
property rights with the evolving needs of society, the controlling
law demands reevaluation.' 9 Part One of this Comment will exoverruled on other grounds, Durruthy v. Brunert, 228 N.J. Super. 199, 203, 549 A.2d
456, 458 (App. Div. 1988), certif denied, 114 N.J. 482, 555 A.2d 607 (1989).
17 See Hensel, supra note 15, at 326-27 (proposing that mortgagees' and tenants'
conflicting interests can be accommodated by utilizing a practice at foreclosure
sales akin to the two funds doctrine of mortgage law).
18 Compare Act of June 25, 1974, ch. 49, § 2, 1974 N.J. Laws 120-21 (West)
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987)) (stating that "no
lessee or tenant.. . may be removed.., from any house, building.... or tenement
leased for residential purposes, other than owner-occupied premises with not more
than two rental units ...

except upon establishment of ...

good cause" as defined

by the Act) and id. at 122, § 4 (stating that "[n]o landlord may evict, or fail to renew
any lease of any premises covered by . . . this act . . . except for good cause as

defined" by the Act) with Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623-26, 428 A.2d at 1292-94 (holding
Anti-Eviction Act inapplicable to foreclosing mortgagees, in part, because the Act
makes consistent references to landlords, thereby evincing a legislative intent to
target landlord-tenant relations generally and not foreclosing mortgagees). Also
compare Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West)
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987), the legislation
extends the Anti-Eviction Act's scope to specify that a tenant "may not be removed
by any order or judgment for possession from the premises by the owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession," indicating a legislative intent to expand the Act's applicability beyond traditional landlord-tenant relations) with
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619 A.2d 241,
247 (App. Div. 1993) (ruling that the amended Anti-Eviction Act does not apply to
foreclosing mortgagees because the New Jersey State Legislature failed to unambiguously modify the rights of foreclosing mortgagees), certif granted, No. A-4052/
6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
19 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(noting that courts had a duty to "reappraise old doctrines," the court explained
that " 'the continued vitality of the common law ...

depends on its ability to reflect

contemporary community values and ethics.' ") (citations omitted). The changes in
landlord-tenant law during the last thirty years aptly illustrate the tensions between
common law doctrine and the needs of present day society. For example, under
the common law
relations between landlords and tenants [were] defined by the law of
property. Under these traditional common law property concepts, a
lease was viewed as a conveyance of real property ....

The relation-

ship between landlord and tenant was controlled by the doctrine of
caveat lessee; that is, the tenant took possession of the demised premises irrespective of their state of disrepair. .

.

. The landlord's only

covenant was to deliver possession to the tenant. The tenant's obligation to pay rent existed independently of the landlord's duty to deliver possession, so that as long as possession remained in the tenant,
the tenant remained liable for payment of rent. The landlord was
under no duty to render the premises habitable unless there was an
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plore the common law roots of the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee
triangle and the manner in which the common law evolved once
express covenant to repair in the written lease. The land, not the
dwelling, was regarded as the essence of the conveyance.
Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 206-07 (Vt. 1984) (citations omitted).
The notion of caveat lessee, transplanted from the agrarian society in which it
developed, eventually became inconsistent with the evolving needs of America's
urbanized society. Javins, 428 A.2d at 1074-75 ("[s]ome courts have realized that
certain of the old rules of property law governing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions."). See Hilder, 478 A.2d at 207 (explaining that the common law
tenant/farmer was readily capable of performing his own repairs on leased premises, the court illustrated the absurdity of perpetuating the notion of "caveat
lessee" by contrasting the common law tenant/farmer with today's urban tenant,
who often lacks the ability to perform his own repairs on demised premises). While
the common law tenant relied upon the land transferred by his lease, America's
urban tenant expects a place to live. Javins, 428 A.2d at 1074. Nevertheless, these
expectations were frustrated by an American judiciary that rigidly adhered to the
common law and a concomitant legislative failure to take notice of the practical
differences between America's urbanized society and antiquated common law doctrine. See id (noting the irony in treating " 'predominantly contractual obligations'
in leases" as that which should be controlled by "old property law.").
During the 1960s, however, America's courts began to modify outdated common law concepts. See Hilder, 478 A.2d at 207 (explaining that in the 1960s the
judiciary recognized that common law, as applied to residential leases, had become
"an anachronism in the twentieth century, urban society"). The judiciary recognized that:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today,
they seek a well known package of goods and services - a package
which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat,
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows
and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074 (footnote omitted). As a result of these recognitions,
courts began to expand upon landlords' duties with respect to maintaining leased
premises in habitable condition. Hilder, 478 A.2d at 207-08 (citations omitted).
In tune with theJavins rationale, New Jersey's courts have been quite active in
attempting to balance tenants' needs for housing with landlords' rights to own
property. See, e.g., Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. Super. 521, 537-38,
303 A.2d 298, 306-07 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of municipal rent leveling ordinances); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970) (expanding remedies available to tenant constructively evicted by landlord's breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment, the court held that a tenant would be entitled to offset
rent by costs incurred in repairing leasehold premises after landlord received notice of defects but failed to repair); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 46061, 251 A.2d 268, 276-77 (1969) (implying a covenant of quiet enjoyment into a
lease, the court held that the landlord's substantial breach of this covenant resulted
in a constructive eviction of the tenant, entitling the tenant to vacate the premises
and relieving tenant of rent liability). See also Note, New Rights For New Jersey Tenants-"Good Cause" Eviction and "Reasonable" Rents, 6 Rtrr.-CAM. L.J. 565, 565-68,
574-82 (1975) (describing the broad sweep of protections offered by New Jersey's
newly enacted Anti-Eviction Act and pinpointing the Act's potential constitutional
infirmities). Cf Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292 (holding that the AntiEviction Act was applicable only to landlord tenant relations and therefore could
not be used to prevent mortgagees from evicting defaulting mortgagors' tenants).

1014

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1006

transplanted to New Jersey. Part Two will explore New Jersey's
Anti-Eviction Act, judicial construction removing the legislation's
constraints from foreclosing mortgagees and subsequent amendments to the Act. Finally, Part Three will examine the constitutional, financial, and public policy implications of applying New
Jersey's amended Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosure-related
evictions.

I.
A.

THE MORTGAGOR-TENANT-MORTGAGEE TRIANGLE

The Common Law Tenant's Plight

When the common law mortgagor defaulted on a mortgage,
legal ownership of the mortgaged property immediately vested in
the mortgagee.20 Consistent with this right of ownership, the
mortgagee could, following default, take possession of the mortgaged premises and oust the mortgagor. 2 1 With respect to taking
20 See 4 GEORGE E. OSBORNE, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.5 (1952) (ex-

plaining the development of common law mortgages). Under the common law, a
mortgage operated as a conveyance of the mortgagor's fee on condition subsequent, i.e., payment of the loan advanced by the mortgagee. Id. If the mortgagor
did not pay his debt on the exact due date, the mortgagee was entitled to retain the
mortgaged premises in fee simple absolute "and the mortgagor had finally and irrevocably lost his land." Id. Later, equity intervened and relieved mortgagors of
the harshness of this forfeiture and allowed mortgagors an equitable right to redeem their mortgaged property provided that the mortgagor paid principal and
interest within a reasonable time after default. Id. § 16.6 (footnote omitted). Conversely, if the mortgagor failed to pay within a reasonable time, the mortgagee
could obtain a court decree ordering the mortgagor to pay by a certain date, or be
forever barred from redeeming. Id. This right of the mortgagor was known as
equity of redemption. Id.; see also THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAw 607-08 (5th ed. 1956) (explaining that mortgagees had not
ceded possession to mortgagors until at least the seventeenth century). When
mortgagors were finally permitted to retain possession until default, courts struggled with how to characterize a "mortgagor-possessor" and disagreed about the
legal rights to be accorded to such a possessor. OSBORNE, supra, at § 16.5. Early
courts offered various descriptions of a mortgagor in possession: tenant at will,
tenant at sufferance, or tenancy for a term. Id. Nevertheless, while the notion of
mortgagors' equitable estate developed and equity courts continued to whittle away
at the contours of common law mortgages, mortgagors remaining in possession
became an accepted practice. PLUCKNETT, supra, at 608; see generally OSBORNE, supra,

at § 16.5. Eventually, mortgagors could even cut their mortgaged estate into
"lesser estates" and lease their land to others. Id. at § 16.7. This option, of course,
created problems for common law tenants whose landlord defaulted on a mortgage. See, e.g., Keech v. Hall, 99 Eng. Rep. 17, 18 (1778) (explaining the general
rule that a leasehold subsequent in time to the execution of a mortgage is
subordinate to the mortgagee's right to possession).
21 See OSBORNE, supra note 20, at § 16.5 (explaining that once the mortgagor
failed to pay the mortgagee, title became "absolute" in the mortgagee and the
"mortgagor had finally and irrevocably lost his land").
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possession as against the mortgagor's tenants, however, the familiar common law principle of "first in time, first in right" applied.22 Accordingly, foreclosing mortgagees could evict only
those tenants whose tenancies commenced subsequent to the mortgage's execution.23 Alternatively, tenancies existing when the
mortgage was executed constituted superior, first-in-time interests and the right to possession remained in the tenant even after
his landlord defaulted on the subsequent-in-time mortgage. 4
22 See Note, Mortgagee's Right to Rent After Default, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 273
(1931) (explaining common law principle that a mortgagee acquiring an interest
first in time held an interest superior to a subsequent leaseholder, who therefore
took subject to the mortgage); see generally Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of
Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75 (1985) (exploring the common law concept that
"first possession is the root of title.").
23 See Keech, 99 Eng. Rep. at 18 (setting forth the general rule that a lease subsequent to the execution of a mortgage was subordinate to the mortgagee's interest
and subject to every incident thereto). Lord Mansfield explained:
[W]e are all clearly of opinion, that there is no inference of fraud or
consent against the mortgagee, to prevent him from considering the
lessee as a wrong-doer .... [H]ere the question turns upon the agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee: when the mortgagor is
left in possession, the true inference to be drawn, is an agreement that
he shall possess the premises at will in the strictest sense ... he is not
even entitled to reap the crop, as other tenants at will are, because all
is liable to the debt; on payment of which the mortgagee's title ceases.
The mortgagor has no power, express or implied, to let leases, not subject to every
circumstanceof the mortgage.... The tenant stands exactly in the situation of the
mortgagor.
Id. (emphasis added); see also OSBORNE, supra note 20, at § 16.91 (quoting Keech for
support, the author explained that "[w]here the mortgage precedes the lease the
lessee's rights can rise no higher than those of his landlord, the mortgagor.").
In general, the rules regulating relations among the respective parties of the
mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle appear to have been shaped by the Latin
maxim nemo dat quod non habet. See Steven L. Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under
Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 803, 808 n.13 (1988) (translating the phrase as "one
cannot give what one does not have"). Id. Under this principle, the mortgagorlandlord could not give what he did not have, and therefore could not transfer to
his mortgagee the full right of beneficial ownership if his estate was encumbered by
a lease. Similarly, if the landlord's estate was subject to defeasance upon default on
the mortgage, the landlord could not transfer to a tenant any rights that were
greater than his own defeasible estate.
24 See, e.g., Moss v. Gallimore, 99 Eng. Rep. 182, 183 (1779) (explaining that a
lease executed prior to a mortgage is an interest paramount to the mortgagee's
interest); Rogers v. Humphreys, Ill Eng. Rep. 799, 804 (1835) (pointing out that
"if ... a lease is prior to the mortgage, the mortgagee has the same rights against
the lessee and those claiming under him that the mortgagor had, and no other than
he had, and his remedy must be on the lease as assignee of the reversion as long as
the lease is in existence ..
"). These early English cases demonstrate the proposition that upon default by a mortgagor, the mortgagee steps into the mortgagor's
shoes with regard to the former landlord's tenants whose tenancies commenced
prior to the execution of the mortgage, as the assignee of the landlord's reversion.
See Snyder J. King, Comment, The Effect Of A Mortgage ForeclosureOn A Lease Executed
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The timing and, therefore, priority of tenants' leases also determined the nature of the relationship that would exist between
the tenant and mortgagee following the mortgagor's default.2 5
The mortgagee could view subsequent-in-time tenants as trespassers and therefore could dispossess them in an ejectment action. 26 The tenant, however, could escape dispossession by
attorning 27 to the mortgagee, who would then become the tenant's landlord.28
Conversely, prior-in-time tenants retained a superior right to
possess the mortgaged premises even after the mortgagor defaulted. 29 Because the tenancy existed prior to the execution of
Subsequent To The Mortgage, 17 WASH. L. REV. 37, 38-39 (1942) (explaining that a
lessor's mortgageable estate after executing a lease consisted of the reversion and
the right to rents; under the common law a mortgage executed subsequent to the
lease would cover both interests "without any specific mention").
25 See King, supra note 24, at 38, 41 (explaining that the nature of mortgagees'
and tenants' rights following default by the mortgagor is determined by the relative
times at which each received an interest in the subject property).
26 Rogers, 111 Eng. Rep. at 804. See also King, supra note 24, at 39 ("As against
the prior mortgagee the tenant was merely a trespasser and could be evicted as he
might by any holder of a paramount title."); Cornelio, supra note 9, at 365-66
(pointing out that the "subsequent-in-time" common law tenant stood in the shoes
of his landlord; since the landlord could be ousted by the mortgagee following
default on the mortgage, the tenant could similarly lose his right to possession).
27 "Attornment" is a tenant's acknowledgment of a new person as his landlord.
See BLACK'S LAW DIc'rIONARY 130 (6th ed. West 1990) ("It is an act by which a
tenant acknowledges his obligation to a new landlord."). For a discussion on attornment, its use and ramification, see King, supra note 24, at 42-43; 2 LEONARD A.
JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 982 (8th ed.
1928). See also Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N.J.L. 157, 159, 167 A. 748 (1933) (explaining New Jersey courts' interpretation of the attornment concept).
28 See Underhay v. Reed, 20 Q.B.D 209, 214 (1887) (stating that a mortgagee
could continue the lease granted by the mortgagor or at least create a year-to-year
tenancy pursuant to the lease terms); see alsojones, supra note 27, at § 982 (explaining that since the mortgagee has a superior title to a tenant whose leasehold interest begins subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, the tenant must attorn to
the mortgagee in order to escape eviction by the mortgagee's superior title). If the
tenant paid rent to the mortgagee and the mortgagee accepted the payment, the
attornment was complete. Id. By accepting rent, the mortgagee ratified the mortgagor's acceptance of a tenant and therefore impliedly consented to the tenant's
remaining in possession. Id. Moreover, early case law indicates that once an attornment was complete, the rights and duties of the new landlord (mortgagee) and
tenant would not be determined by the rigid principles of mortgage law, but on a
case by case basis within the context of landlord-tenant law. See Rogers, 111 Eng.
Rep. at 804 (noting that the remedy of the mortgagee after attornment would "depend upon the particular circumstances of each case").
29 See Moss v. Gallimore, 99 Eng. Rep. 182, 183 (1779) (in "the case of lands let
for years and afterwards mortgaged, ... the lease protecting the possession of such
tenant he cannot be turned out by the mortgagee"). In accordance with the maxim
nemo dat non quod habet, the mortgagee, when taking a mortgage on land that had
already been leased, could take only what the landlord could offer at the time, the
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the mortgage, the mortgagee took his mortgage subject to the
tenant's leasehold rights.3 ° As the assignee of the landlord-mortgagor's reversion, after the mortgagor's default, the mortgagee
became entitled to the rents and profits of the leased premises
but could not eject the tenant until the lease expired. 3 '
B.

The Common Law Transplanted to New Jersey
When the common law arrived in America, states either
adopted,32 rejected,33 or modified 34 the basic mechanics of common law mortgages. 35 Unlike "title states," which adopted the
common law wholesale, or "lien states," which drastically altered

reversionary interest obtaining after the expiration of the tenant's lease. See JONES,
supra note 27, at § 979 (explaining that a mortgage of property already leased is an
assignment of the landlord's reversion).
30 JONES, supra note 27, at § 978; see also Robert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problems in
Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 8 (1961) (explaining
the principle that a lease that is prior to a mortgage, if duly recorded, represents a
property interest superior to that of the mortgagee). The author further explained
that the same may also be true even if the lease was not recorded because in most
states "possession gives all the world notice of the tenant's rights." Id.
31 Moss, 99 Eng. Rep. at 184 (approving mortgagee's request for rent from tenant of defaulting mortgagor because the mortgagee had a legal right to the rent); see
also JONES, supra note 27, at § 979 ("The mere execution of the mortgage subsequent to the lease operates as an assignment of the reversion, and carries the rent
as incident to it, and the mortgagee is entitled, upon notice to the tenant, to receive
the rents whenever he [the mortgagee] is entitled to possession.").
32 For example, Alabama, Maine, Maryland, and Tennessee have adopted the
common law theory of mortgages - these states are said to follow the "title theory" of mortgages. ROBERT KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAw AND PRACTICE
§ 294 (1972). Therefore, upon execution of the mortgage, the mortgagee becomes
entitled to the full right of possession of the mortgaged premises. Id. The title
holder, the mortgagee, also obtains the right to the rents and profits of the mortgaged property. Id.; see also OSBORNE, supra note 20, at § 16.14 (explaining the title
theory of mortgages).
33 States that have rejected the common law theory of mortgages adhere to the
"lien theory." KRATOVIL, supra note 32, at § 294. Despite the execution of a mortgage, the mortgagor remains, for all intents and purposes, the "owner" of the
mortgaged property, and is entitled to the mortgaged estate's possession, rents and
profits. Id. The mortgagee's interest is recognized as a lien upon the mortgaged
property. Id. If the mortgagor defaults in paying his mortgage, the mortgagee may
enforce its lien and collect the debt owed by the mortgagor from the proceeds
realized at a foreclosure sale. See also OSBORNE, supra note 20, at § 16.15 (explaining the lien theory of mortgages).
34 States that have modified the common law theory of mortgages are known as
"intermediate theory" states. Id. at § 16.14. In states following the "intermediate"
or "hybrid" theory, the mortgagor is entitled to all the incidents of a common law
title until the mortgagor defaults on the mortgage. Id. At this time, all the incidents of title pass to the mortgagee, who may take possession and collect the rents
and profits of the mortgaged premises. KRATOVIL, supra note 32, at § 294. Intermediary states include Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina and Ohio. Id.
35 KRATOVIL, supra note 32, at § 294; OSBORNE, supra note 20, at § 16.14; see
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the common law, New Jersey chose to modify the mechanics of
common law mortgages.3 6 In New Jersey, the mortgagor would
remain in possession of mortgaged property until default. 3 7 After default and before foreclosure, however, "all the incidents of
a common law title" would pass to the mortgagee. 3 8 Accordingly, when the mortgagor defaulted, the mortgagee received full
title to the mortgaged premises, entitling him to the possession,
rents and profits of the mortgaged estate. 39 The mortgagor
supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text for an explanation of the mechanics of
common law mortgages.
36 See KRATOVIL, supra note 32, at § 294 (including New Jersey in a list of intermediary states and explaining that title states adopted common law while lien states
changed common law); see also Stewart v. Fairchild-Baldwin Co., 91 N.J. Eq. 86, 88,
108 A. 301, 302 (1919) (stating that the common law rule pertaining to mortgage
theory has not been adopted in New Jersey); Sanderson v. Price, 21 N.J.L. 637, 642
(1846) (noting that "an action at law must be brought to settle the sum due and it is
not until 60 days after judgment, without payment, [i.e., default] that any right of
possession is vested in the mortgagee"); Sanderson, 21 N.J. Eq. at 646 n.(a) (Carpenter, J., dissenting) (explaining that, contrary to the common law rule, "ejectment
will not lie by the mortgagee against the mortgagor until after default made").
37 Shields v. Lozear, 34 N.J.L. 496, 501 (N.J. 1869). The Shields court explained:
By the common law, a mortgage in fee created an immediate estate in
fee simple in the mortgagee, subject to be defeated by the payment of
the mortgage money on the day named in the condition, and the
mortgagee might enter immediately on the mortgaged premises, and
hold the estate until the condition was performed. In this state, it was
held by this court that the right to enter was postponed, and the possession was in the mortgagor, until the condition was broken by default in the payment of the mortgage money. With this modification of
the rights of the mortgagee, as to the postponement of ability to obtain the possession of the mortgaged premises, the nature of the
mortgage as a conveyance remains as it was at common law.
Id. (citation omitted).
38 Stewart, 91 N.J. Eq. at 88-89, 108 A. 302-03. The Stewart court explained that
after the mortgagor's default, the mortgagee is entitled to take possession of the
mortgaged property. Id. at 89, 108 A. at 302. The court also noted, however, that
the mortgagor's equitable right to redeem could divest the mortgagee of this right
to possession. Id. This equitable right enables the mortgagor to "retrieve" his lost
title from the mortgagee after the title passed to the mortgagee upon the mortgagor's default. See OSBORNE, supra note 20, at § 16.16 (describing the development
and characteristics of mortgagors' equitable right to redeem mortgaged property).
39 Stewart, 91 N.J. Eq. at 89, 108 A. at 302. The court explained that the mortgagee's right to the profits of the mortgaged estate accrued upon the mortgagee's
taking possession, but not before. Id. To hold otherwise, the court determined,
would destroy the mortgagor's rights, which continued in force as before default,
up until the time the mortgagee acted affirmatively to end the mortgagor's predefault estate. Id.
The court also pointed out that the mortgagee, upon taking possession and
putting an end to the mortgagor's estate, is liable to credit the mortgagor's debt
with any profits received from the mortgaged estate. Id. This notion of accounting
to the mortgagor was alien to the common law, the court explained, but a court of
equity, guided by considerations of fairness to the mortgagor, would enforce mort-
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could thereafter divest the mortgagee, however, through an equitable proceeding to redeem.4 °
Beyond modifying the basic mechanics of common law mortgages, however, New Jersey did little to change the common law
rights of the respective parties in the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle.41 Significantly, New Jersey adopted wholesale the
common law rules governing the "triangle. ' ' 4 '

Therefore,

whether a lease preceded or followed the creation of a mortgage
played a significant role in determining possessory rights after
default.

43

New Jersey also adopted common law remedies with respect
to the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle.44 For example, if
the mortgagee sought to obtain possession of mortgaged premises after default, 45 an ejectment action could be used to oust the
gages only to the extent of their real purpose (security for a debt), and would compel the mortgagee to account to the mortgagor for any profits received from the
mortgaged estate. Id.
40 Id. at 89; see also supra note 38 (offering an explanation of the mortgagor's
equitable right to redeem a mortgaged estate).
41 See Shields, 34 N.J.L. at 501 ("With this modification of the rights of the mortgagee, as to the postponement of ability to obtain possession of the mortgaged
premises, the nature of the mortgage as a conveyance remains as it was at common
law.").
42 See 1 IRWIN LEWINE, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT IN NEW JERSEY,
§ 546 (1942) (explaining New Jersey's adoption of the common law distinction between leases made prior to and subsequent to the execution of a mortgage and the
different possessory rights that flow therefrom after the mortgagor's default). In
New Jersey, a lease made prior to the execution of a mortgage was superior in right
and the subsequent mortgagee took his security subject to the lease. Id.; see also
Thomas v. DeBaum, 14 N.J. Eq. 37, 39 (1861) (stating law in New Jersey that a
mortgage executed subsequent to a prior lease is subordinate to that lease). On the
other hand, New Jersey also adhered to the common law rule that a lease created
subsequent to the execution of a mortgage was subordinate to the mortgage and
could be terminated upon default by the landlord-mortgagor. LEWINE, supra, at
546; see also Betts v. Wurth, 32 N.J. Eq. 82, 83-84 (1880) (explaining that prior in
time mortgage is superior to a subsequent lease; foreclosure on the mortgage will
terminate the tenant's leasehold estate).
43 LEWINE, supra note 42, at § 546; see also notes 22-23 (discussing common law
rationales for giving priority to first-in-time interests).
44 See generally LEWINE, supra note 42, at §§ 497-543 (discussing the rights, du-

ties, and liabilities of the respective parties in the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle in New Jersey). See also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text for a
discussion on the common law remedies available to the respective parties in the
mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle.
45 See Sanderson v. Price, 21 N.J.L. 637, 646 n.(a) (1846) (explaining that an
action of ejectment will not lie against mortgagor until after default on the mortgage and expressing the view that postponing the use of such action until after
default is "clearly against the common law rule, and contrary to the rule previously
held in this state.").
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mortgagor and all those holding under him, subject to the possessory rights of any prior-in-time tenants.4 6 If the tenant attorned 4 7 to the mortgagee, however, he could remain in
possession and avoid ejectment whether the lease preceded or
succeeded the mortgage." On the other hand, if the tenant refused to attorn to the mortgagee, the mortgagee could maintain
an ejectment action against the tenant regardless of the priority
of the tenant's lease.4 9
Early New Jersey cases held that tenants were not entitled to
notice before ejectment proceedings. 50 Subsequent courts, how46 LEWINE, supra note 42, at § 503; see also Sanderson, 21 N.J.L. at 645-46 (Carpenter, J., dissenting) (explaining the rule in New Jersey that if the mortgagee
chooses to exercise his post-default right to the mortgagor's estate, the mortgagee
may "enter, take the rents and profits, and eject the tenant"); Hinck v. Cohn, 86
N.J.L. 615, 617, 92 A. 378, 379 (1914) (noting that after default on a mortgage, the
mortgagee is entitled to maintain an action in ejectment against the defaulting
mortgagor's tenant). Cf supra notes 29-31 (explaining that a tenancy prior-in-time
to the mortgage is unaffected by mortgagor's default).
47 See supra note 27 for a definition of attornment. Providing a historical background, the Del-New court explained how the attornment concept developed in
New Jersey:
Attornment is an act by which a tenant acknowledges his obligation to
a new landlord. At common law it never became effectual without the
consent or knowledge of the landlord or by due process of law. At
common law the owners could not alienate without the consent of a
tenant, which consent was called an attornment, nor could the tenancy be substituted by the act of the tenant without the consent of the
lord ... [M]utuality of consent, either voluntary or constructive, was
necessary to make out an attornment. This rigid rule was later relaxed
... when attornment ceased to be necessary to complete a voluntary
conveyance.
Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N.J.L. 157, 159, 167 A. 747, 748 (N.J. 1933) (citations
omitted).
48 LEWINE, supra note 42, at § 540 (explaining that tenants may attorn to any
mortgagee after the mortgagee gains the right to possess the mortgaged premises
occupied by the tenant); see also Hinck, 86 NJ.L. at 617 (pointing out that a tenant,
through attornment, acknowledges the superior right of possession that accrued in
the mortgagee following default by the landlord-mortgagor). In effect, the tenant's
attornment put the mortgagee in constructive possession of the mortgaged premises. Id.; cf Del-New Co., 111 N.J.L. at 160, 167 A. at 748 (explaining the proposition
that a mortgagee who acquires property following default by the mortgagor holds
the property only as security for the mortgage debt). Accordingly, "the utmost
dominion that he [the mortgagee] can exercise over [the property] ... is either to
appropriate it, or have it appropriated to the payment of his [the mortgagee's]
debt." Id. (citations omitted). By accepting the tenant's attornment, the mortgagee
thus utilizes the security for the mortgagor's debt, i.e., the land leased to the tenant, to appropriate the profits accruing therefrom to satisfy the debt. Id.
49 LEWINE, supra note 42, at § 540. See generally Comment, The Mortgagee's Right
to Rents After Default, 50 YALE LJ. 1424, 1435 (1941).
50 See, e.g., Den v. Wade, 20 N.J.L. 291, 294 (1844) (ruling that mortgagor's tenant was not entitled to a notice to quit before ejectment action was brought by
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ever, impliedly overruled these cases. 5' Interestingly, New
Jersey's mortgagees were not always willing to oust mortgagors'
tenants, especially during America's Great Depression. 5 2 Mort-

gagees refrained from evicting tenants during this era because
the value of the property with a steady income often exceeded
the fair market value of the property without the rents.5 3 In such
cases, New Jersey courts held that mortgagees could collect rents
either by taking possession of the mortgaged
premises, or by pe54
receiver.
a
appoint
to
court
a
titioning
assignee of mortgagee because such notice was required only where a landlordtenant relationship exists); Den v. Stockton, 12 N.J.L. 322, 324-25 (1831) (stating
that tenants who held under mortgagor by virtue of lease executed subsequent to
mortgage were not entitled to notice to quit because New Jersey's courts have
never held that mortgagors were entitled to notice to quit prior to the mortgagee's
taking possession).
51 See, e.g., Ellveeay Newspaper Ass'n v. Wagner Market Co., 110 N.J.L. 577,
580, 166 A. 332, 333 (1933) (holding that termination of a lease of mortgaged
property depended on whether the lessee was joined in the foreclosure action), aff'd
per curiam, 112 N.J.L. 88, 169 A. 692 (1934); American-Italian Building & Loan
Assn. v. Liotta, 117 N.J.L. 467, 471, 189 A. 118, 120 (1937) ("unless a tenant is
made a party defendant to the foreclosure suit his interest is unaffected thereby")
(citation omitted); Walgreen Co. v. Moore, 116 N.J. Eq. 348, 349, 173 A. 587, 588
(Ch. 1934) ("Undoubtedly a lease may be terminated by the foreclosure of a prior
mortgage, but to accomplish that end the lessee must be made a party defendant to
the foreclosure proceedings; otherwise he is not bound by the decree."). See also
Gilbert D. Chamberlain, Note, Ejectment As A Possessory Remedy Available To A Mortgagee On Default, 4 NEWARK L. REV. 183, 183, 188 (1939) (arguing that ejectment is a
convenient and cost effective, although rarely used, remedy for mortgagees seeking
possession of mortgaged, leased premises).
52 Comment, supra note 49, at 1424-25. In reaching the conclusion that it is
preferable and cost effective to have a mortgagee take possession and collect rents
from mortgaged premises, rather than having a receiver appointed, the author
explained:
Foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property in an atmosphere of
declining land values has frequently yielded less than the secured
debt.... Rents often represent the only liquid asset which a mortgagee can reach to supplement or to avoid levying immediately upon the
shrinking value that the pledged security still retains. The right to
rents uniformly has been held to follow possession of the mortgaged
premises. But ... courts have become increasingly reluctant to recognize any inherent right to possession in the mortgagee ... [and] have

hesitated to give effect to [rent collection devices contained in mortgage agreements].
Id.
53 Id.; cf Note, Remedies Against "Milking" Of Property By Mortgagors, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 491, 491 (1933) (explaining that "[d]eflation of real estate values and conse-

quent extinction of the equities of mortgagors has given new prominence to 'milking' on the part of debtors resigned to the loss of their property and determined to
anticipate every possible source of revenue before being compelled to surrender
possession.").
54 LEWINE, supra note 42, at § 517; see also Leeds v. Gifford, 41 N.J. Eq. 464, 467,
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Notwithstanding the practices during the Great Depression,
the mortgagee's underlying rights to mortgaged land following
default by the mortgagor remained the same in New Jersey as
under the common law.5 5 The mortgagee's right to possession
after default remained paramount, leaving tenants exposed to
the menace of enforcing the mortgagee's mortgage." 5 6
C.

Updating Landlord-Tenant Law: New Jersey's Rejection of
Common Law Doctrine

The common law has thus remained an integral part in regulating the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle in New Jersey.5 7
Over time, however, New Jersey's courts and legislature indirectly influenced the enforcement of common law rights by modifying the methods by which tenants could be removed from their
leasehold premises. 5 8 During the 1960s and 1970s, absolute
5 A. 795, 797 (1886) (noting that a mortgage, in and of itself, does not carry with it
the rents); Stanton v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 345, 347, 152 A. 653,
654 (Ch. 1930) (explaining that the "mortgagee is not entitled to rents of mortgaged premises, accruing after default, unless and until he takes possession, personally or by a receiver duly appointed for that purpose."). See Bermes v. Kelley,
108 N.J. Eq. 289, 290-91, 164 A. 860, 861 (1931):
At default a mortgagee becomes entitled to possession of the mortgaged premises; that possession, if exercised, entitles him to receive
the rents. Possession may be taken either personally or through a receiver appointed by the court for that purpose in a foreclosure suit.
But unless and until that possessory right is exercised by a mortgagee,
the mortgagor is entitled to the rents as against the mortgagee.
Id.
55 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (explaining New Jersey's early
adoption of the common law rules governing the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee
triangle).
56 Sever v. Yetter, 128 N.J. Eq. 367, 370, 16 A.2d 461, 462 (Ch. 1940).
57 See Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 623, 625, 428
A.2d 1289, 1292, 1293-94 (1981) (adhering to the common law rules in spite of
evidence of a legislative intent to the contrary). The court determined that New
Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-61.1 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987),
did not apply to prohibit mortgagees from evicting defaulting mortgagors' tenants,
despite the legislature's inclusion of a statement, appended to Assembly Bill 1586,
that indicates an intent to protect non-offending tenants from arbitrary and capricious evictions. Id. See also supra note 13 (setting forth the full text of the New
Jersey State Legislature's statement appended to Assembly Bill 1586).
58 See SHARON R. MARK & RAYMOND I. KORONA, 23 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE § 2551
(1990) (explaining that when landlords wished to regain possession of demised
premises in early New Jersey, and had a legal right to do so, the landlord had two
options). Landlords could either bring an action in ejectment against the tenant
wrongfully holding over, or use "self help eviction" to accomplish the same purpose. Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972). Because ejectment actions were
cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming, landlords usually chose the "self
help" remedy. Id. Self-help remedies, whereby the landlord forcefully evicted the
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rights under the common law were questioned and modified pursuant to legislative and judicial recognition that antiquated common law doctrines could no longer serve modern society.59
Significant limitations were placed on the landlord's ability to remove, by way of eviction, tenants from leasehold premises. 60 For
example, some jurisdictions created the retaliatory eviction defense prohibiting tenant evictions motivated by the landlord's desire to seek revenge on tenants reporting landlord misconduct. 6 '
tenant, often resulted, however, in violence and generally disrupted public order.
Id. at 71-72 (explaining the ill effects of self-help evictions). As a result, the New
Jersey Legislature enacted summary dispossess statutes. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-53 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987).
Summary dispossess statutes were designed to provide "very rapid means for
deciding who, for the time being, was entitled to immediate possession." Troy,
Ltd. v. Renna, 580 F. Supp. 69, 70 (D.NJ. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 287
(3d Cir. 1982). New Jersey's summary dispossess statute states that a tenant may be
evicted, provided that good cause is not required for eviction pursuant to NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992), if the tenant: a) holds over after the
expiration of the lease term and the landlord has furnished sufficient notice of the
eviction; b) defaults in payments of rent; or c) is disorderly, damages or injures the
premises, repeatedly violates the landlord's rules and regulations, or commits a
breach of any lease covenants where a right of reentry has been reserved by the
landlord but the tenant nevertheless holds over. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53(a)-(c)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
59 SeeJavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076-79 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(criticizing modern day courts' sluggish move toward discarding out-dated common law concepts and reasoning that the common law must evolve to meet the
needs of present day society because the common law, with regard to landlordtenant relations, was based upon premises that are no longer true, i.e., that the
land, and not the residence, is the tenant's central concern).
60 Bell, supra note 9, at 501 (detailing United States' general move away from
common law views concerning the duration of tenancies by implementing and creating modem day legislation, retaliatory eviction defenses, and just cause eviction
requirements).
61 E.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1016 (1969). The court determined that allowing landlords to evict complaining tenants would frustrate Congress's intent to "secure for the city's slum
dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live" through the passage of
housing codes. Id. at 700-01. Reasoning that such evictions would force potential
complainants to forego reporting violations, the court ruled that retaliatory evictions were not permissible. Id. at 699. In addition, the court's language in the
opinion is indicative of the growing judicial concern for protecting tenants:
As judges, 'we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and
general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are not
struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as
men.' In trying to effect the will of Congress ... we have the responsibility to consider the social context in which our decisions will have
operational effect. In light of the appalling condition and shortage of
housing in Washington, the expense of moving, the inequality of bargaining power between tenant and landlord, and the social and economic importance of assuring at least minimum standards in housing
conditions, we do not hesitate to declare that retaliatory eviction can-
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The New Jersey Legislature followed this lead by modifying and
codifying the retaliatory eviction defense. 62 Absent a retaliatory
motive, however, landlords retained an absolute right to evict
their tenants at the lease term's expiration.6"
New Jersey's adherence to this common law practice ended
in 1974 when the state legislature enacted New Jersey's AntiEviction Act. 64 The Act rejected common law notions of propnot be tolerated. There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even
though his home be marred by housing code violations, will pause
long before he complains of them if he fears eviction as a consequence. . . . [If such evictions are permitted they] would stand as a
warning to others that they dare not be so bold, a result which, from
the authorization of the housing code, we think Congress affirmatively
sought to avoid.
Id. at 701.
62 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). In NewJersey,
landlords may not evict a tenant:
a. As a reprisal for the tenant's efforts to secure or enforce any rights
under the lease or contract or under the laws of the state of New
Jersey or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States; or
b. As a reprisal for the tenant's good faith complaint to a governmental authority of the landlord's alleged violation of any health or
safety law, regulation, code or ordinance, or State law or regulation
which has as its objective the regulation of premises used for dwelling
purposes, or
c. As a reprisal for the tenant's being an organizer of, a member of,
or involved in any activities of, any lawful organization; or
d. On account of the tenant's failure or refusal to comply with the
terms of the tenancy as altered by the landlord, if the landlord shall
have altered substantially the terms of the tenancy as a reprisal for any
actions of the tenant set forth in subsection a, b, and c of section 1 of
this act. Substantial alteration shall include the refusal to renew a
lease or to continue a tenancy of the tenant without cause.
Id. In addition, the statute requires the landlord to notify the landlord or his agent
of any violations and the tenant must give the landlord a reasonable time to correct
the violation before the tenant may complain to the governmental authority. Id.
Furthermore, the statute states that the landlord will be subject to a civil action if he
or she violates the statute, and may be held liable to the tenant for "damages and
other appropriate relief, including injunctive and other equitable remedies, as may
be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ......
Id.
63 See Edwards, 397 F.2d at 699 (explaining that the prohibition on retaliatory
evictions was a restraint on landlords' right to "evict for any legal reason or for no
reason at all"); see also Bell, supra note 9, at 501 (acknowledging that retaliatory
eviction statutes and other legislation protecting tenants restricted the right under
common law to evict regardless of reason and positing that a contract law, good
faith limitation on terminating tenants' leases would establish solid grounds upon
which courts could explicitly recognize tenants' expectations for continuity in
housing).
64 See Act ofJune 25, 1974 (Anti-Eviction Act), ch. 49, § 2, 1974 N.J. Laws 12022 (limiting the reasons for which residential tenants can be evicted to ten "good
cause" grounds for removal). The Act provided that a residential tenant could be
evicted if:
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erty ownership and established new dimensions to property
rights embodied in the proverbial "bundle of sticks." ' 65 By some
a. The person fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease
whether oral or written;
b. The person has continued to be, after written notice to cease, so
disorderly as to destroy the peace and quiet of the occupants or other
tenants living in said house or neighborhood;
c. The person has willfully or by reason of gross negligence caused
or allowed destruction, damage or injury to the premises;
d. The person has continued, after written notice to cease, to substantially violate or breach any of the landlord's rules and regulations
governing said premises, provided such rules and regulations are reasonable and have been accepted in writing by the tenant or made a
part of the lease;
e. The person has continued, after written notice to cease, to substantially violate or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained in the lease for the premises where a right of re-entry is
reserved to the landlord in the lease for a violation of such covenant
or agreement, provided that such covenant or agreement is
reasonable;
f. The person has failed to pay rent after a valid notice to quit and
notice of increase of said rent, provided the increase in rent is not
unconscionable and complies with any and all other laws or municipal
ordinances governing rent increases;
g. The landlord or owner seeks to board up or demolish the premises because he has been cited by local or State housing inspectors for
substantial violations affecting the health and safety of tenants and it
is economically unfeasible for the owner to eliminate the violations;
h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or
the mobile home park from the rental housing market;
i. The landlord or owner proposes, at the termination of a lease, reasonable changes of substance in the terms and conditions of the lease,
including specifically any change in the term thereof, which the tenant, after written notice, refuses to accept;
j. The person, after written notice to cease, has habitually failed to
pay rent.
Id.
65 See 25 Fairmont Ave. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 280, 326 A.2d 106, 109
(1974) (confronting the question of whether the Anti-Eviction Act was merely procedural, as an amendment and supplement to New Jersey's summary dispossess
statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1952), or actually granted substantive
rights to tenants). The court concluded:
Under the new enactment [N.J.S.A. § 2A:18-61.1] . . .additional limitation upon the Tight to possession has been established, or perhaps it
would be more accurate to say that an owner of property (who is not
excepted from § 2 [of 2A:18-61.1]) once he accepts a tenant on that
property, no longer has a right of possession to it; and he does not
regain that right of possession unless and until the tenant is guilty of
some act or omission which constitutes 'good cause,' or unless and
until the property is to be removed from the rental market. This prohibition affects an element of a property right, the right of possession,
and not the procedure to enforce such right.
Id. at 283-84, 326 A.2d at 110-11.
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accounts, the New Jersey Legislature completely revolutionized
66
landlord-tenant law with the passage of the Anti-Eviction Act.
II.

NEW JERSEY'S ANTI-EVICTION ACT, ITS JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT

A.

New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act

New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act6 7 was born of a legislative
concern that few, if any, restraints were placed upon those seeking to remove tenants from leasehold premises pursuant to New
Jersey's summary dispossess statute.6 8 Because landlords could
evict tenants at the expiration of their leases by resorting to a
summary dispossess action, landlords wielded a powerful weapon
at a time when rental property was in scarce supply. 6 9 Moreover,
66 See Defendants' Motion for Rehearing And Reconsideration, Attachment D,
transcript from Mortgage Services of America v. Federico Santos, F-10951-889,
July 20, 1990, at 19, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, No. F-9447-89, N.J. Super.
Ct., Ch. Div., Essex Cty., Feb. 3, 1992. Commenting upon the effect of New
Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act, Judge Amos Saunders remarked that "the State Legislature just really turned upside down to some extent landlord-tenant law and the
relationship between tenants and landlords." Id.
67 Act of June 25, 1974, ch. 49, 1974 N.J. Laws 120-22 (amending N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 18-53 (West 1952)). The Act amended the Summary Dispossess law by
grafting a good cause requirement onto summary dispossess actions. Id.; see also
supra note 64 (setting forth the text of the unamended Anti-Eviction Act).
68 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). The summary
dispossess action provided "very rapid means for deciding who, for the time being
...[is] entitled to immediate possession." Troy, LTD. v. Renna, 580 F.Supp. 69,
70 (D.N.J. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 727 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of NewJersey's summary dispossess statute, see supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also supra note 13 (quoting the legislative statement attached to
Assembly Bill 1586, which evidences the legislature's concern for tenants who faced
landlords' untrammeled eviction power). This statement has been quite helpful in
enabling courts to construe the Anti-Eviction Act broadly. See, e.g., Surace v. Pappachristou, 244 N.J. Super. 70, 73-74, 581 A.2d 875, 877 (App. Div. 1990) (acknowledging the Act's purpose, the court honored that purpose by prohibiting a
tenant's eviction where the landlord renovated the apartment building and reduced
the number of rental units below the Act's threshold requirement of no more than
two units); Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 569, 573-75, 342 A.2d 529,
530, 532-33 (App. Div. 1975) (relying upon the overall legislative purpose of the
Act as manifested in the Statement, the court rejected landlords' constitutional arguments and prohibited tenants' eviction where the landlords acquired title to
building on May 31, 1974, notified tenants of eviction the same day and the AntiEviction Act was not effective until June 25, 1974). But see Harden v. Pritzert, 178
N.J. Super. 237, 241-42, 428 A.2d 927, 929-30 (App. Div. 1981) (interpreting the
Act in accordance with the legislature's intent, the court used the Statement as a
guide towards finding that the legislature did not intend that large farms with many
residential dwellings located thereon should be included within the types of property subject to the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints).
69 Hensel, supra note 15, at 313. NewJersey's shortage of residential rental units
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landlords could continually raise rents at the expiration of each
lease period.70 If the tenant failed to agree to the new terms, he
could be removed pursuant to the summary dispossess statute
when his term expired, regardless of the tenant's exemplary conduct or expectations for a place to live. 7 '
In 1974, however, the New Jersey Legislature passed the
Anti-Eviction Act,7 2 shielding tenants against arbitrary and capricious evictions and limiting the reasons for which a tenant could
be evicted to several "good cause" grounds specified by the statute. 73 These good cause restraints prevented tenant evictions
was a motivating factor in the passage of the Anti-Eviction Act. The shortage of
rental housing in New Jersey continues to inspire tenant-protective legislation. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.41 (West Supp. 1992) (Legislative Findings and Declarations). The legislation notes that:
the provision and maintenance of an adequate supply of housing affordable to persons of low and moderate income in this State has
been and is becoming increasingly difficult as a result of economic
and market forces which require special public actions or subsidies to
counteract. One particularly acute result of this has been the continual increase in the number of displaced or homeless persons who,
lacking permanent shelter, require special assistance from public services in this State and in surrounding states in order to remain alive.
Id. This statement was a prelude to a section of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act that
established "protected tenancies" for the purpose of limiting, or restraining tenant
evictions when residential apartments are converted to condominiums. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-40 to -59 (West Supp. 1992) (Tenant Protection Act of 1992).
70 Note, supra note 19, at 569; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining the operation of summary dispossess statutes).
71 Note, supra note 19, at 569; see also Bell, supra note 9, at 501. Explaining that
involuntary removal from leased premises deprives the tenant "of both physical
and emotional security," Professor Bell stated:
The combination of specific legislation, the doctrine of retaliatory
eviction, and just cause eviction standards provide a network of protective devices that have drastically reduced the common law rule permitting termination for "any reason or no reason." While these
developments have not accomplished a complete reversal of the common law rule ... they do reflect an increasing, although indirect, recognition that a residential tenant has some legitimate expectation of
continuity in the tenancy ....
[R]esidential tenants have an expectation of a stable and continuous home.
Id.
72 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (explaining the general purposes, causes, and effects of the Anti-Eviction Act); see also Note, supra note 19, at
565-68 (providing a general overview of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act as it was
enacted in 1974).
73 Act ofJune 25, 1974, ch. 49, 1974 N.J. Laws 120-22. See supra note 64 (setting
forth the "good cause" grounds of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act as it was enacted
in 1974); see also Act of Feb. 19, 1976, ch. 311, 1975 N.J. Laws 1234-36 (amending
and supplementing the 1974 Act by adding good cause provisions relating to situations where a landlord or owner seeks to retire permanently residential premises
from the rental market or convert apartments to condominiums); Act of July 27,
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even at the expiration of the tenant's lease term."4 Moreover,
landlords could not raise rents to evict tenants indirectly. 75
While a tenant could be evicted for failing to pay rent, eviction
would not be permitted if the tenant's failure to pay resulted
76
from an unconscionable rent increase.
The Act's constitutionality was almost immediately called
into question.7 7 Early cases focused upon the Act's applicability
1981, ch. 226, 1981 N.J. Laws 862-69 (amending and supplementing the Act by
including references in the Act to the Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act).
74 See Act of June 25, 1974 (Anti-Eviction Act) ch. 49. § 4, 1974 N.J. Laws 122
(stating that "[n]o landlord may evict orfail to renew any lease of any premises covered by . . . this act except for good cause") (emphasis added).
75 Id. § 2(f) (stating that rent increases must be reasonable); see Note, supra note
19, at 569 (pointing out the well-established landlord practice of continually raising
rents and then evicting non-complying tenants through summary dispossess
proceedings).
76 See Act of June 25, 1974, ch. 49, § 2, 1974 N.J. Laws 121; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.1() (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (stating that a tenant may be evicted
from a residential rental dwelling if the tenant "has failed to pay rent after a valid
notice to quit and notice of increase of said rent, provided the increase in rent is
not unconscionable ....
).
77 See Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 342 A.2d 529 (App. Div.
1975). In Stamboulos, the plaintiff-purchasers acquired title to an apartment building on May 31, 1974, and promptly served the defendant month-to-month tenants
with a one month notice to quit. Id. at 569, 342 A.2d at 530. The tenants, however,
held over at the expiration of the one month notice, resulting in the plaintiff-purchasers' institution of a summary dispossess action. Id. The trial court granted
possession to the plaintiff-purchasers, holding that the right to possess the apartment had vested in the plaintiffs on May 31, 1974, the day the tenants received
notice, and that the newly enacted Anti-Eviction Act, which took effect on June 25,
1974, could not be used by the tenants as a shield against eviction. Id. at 569-70,
342 A.2d at 530-31.
The appellate division reversed, ruling that the plaintiff-purchasers' right to
possession vested not on May 31, 1974, but on June 30, 1974, the day that the
tenants' thirty-day notice expired and the time at which the plaintiff-purchasers'
right of possession vested. Id. at 570-71, 342 A.2d at 530-31. Because the AntiEviction Act took effect on June 25, 1974, and the plaintiff-purchasers right of possession did not ripen until June 30, 1974, the court held that the tenants could not
be evicted unless one of the good cause grounds specified by the statute had been
met. Id. at 570, 342 A.2d at 530.
The plaintiff-purchasers argued, however, that applying the Anti-Eviction Act
to month-to-month tenants "violates fundamental property rights and is unreasonable and arbitrary since it bears no rational relationship to the announced statutory
objective." Id. at 572, 342 A.2d at 531. The court rejected the plaintiff-purchaser's
argument, explaining that:
In any event, we cannot say that, in view of the purpose of the new
statute, the situation facing these plaintiffs creates such an unreasonable result as to require invalidating the act as applied to them in the
present factual setting ....
....
The thrust of the new legislation is to maintain the status
quo with respect to tenants who presently have housing in order not
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to leases entered into before the Act took effect. 78 The Act survived that initial salvo7 9 but did not survive all constitutional attacks. 80 For instance, in Sabato v. Sabato, the appellate division
held that the Act could not be applied to prevent tenant evictions
in cases where the landlord wished to convert the premises to his
own personal use.8 ' Such a prohibition, the court explained,
to aggravate that crisis, except where a statutory exclusion or basis for
eviction exists.
Id. at 574, 342 A.2d at 533.
78 See 25 Fairmont Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 326 A.2d 106
(Cty. Dist. Ct. 1974). In Fairmont Ave., the landlord claimed that the Anti-Eviction
Act was unconstitutional if applied to a tenancy created before the Act's enactment
because the Act was neither procedural nor remedial. Id. at 280, 326 A.2d at 109.
Insofar as it created substantive rights, the landlord contended, the Act could not
be applied retroactively to divest the landlords of their vested rights to terminate
the tenancy by proper notice. Id.
The Stockton court agreed that the Anti-Eviction Act created substantive as well
as procedural rights in the tenant:
Under the new enactment, however, additional limitation upon the
right to possession has been established, or perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that an owner of property ... once he accepts a tenant
on that property, no longer has a right of possession to it; and he does
not regain that right of possession unless and until the tenant is guilty
of some act or omission which constitutes 'good cause,' or unless and
until the property is to be removed from the rental market. This prohibition affects an element of a property right, the right of possession,
and not the procedure to enforce such right.
Id. at 283-84, 326 A.2d at 110-11. The court, however, rejected the landlord's argument that the Act would unconstitutionally deprive them of a vested right to
dispossess the tenants. Id. Reasoning that a procedural remedy was not a right, but
a statutorily granted privilege, the court ruled that the landlords did not suffer a
retroactive divestment of a divested right through an application of the Act to protect the tenants from eviction. Id. at 285, 326 A.2d at 111. Accordingly, the court
reversed the trial court's denial of tenants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 289, 326 A.2d
at 113.
79 Id. at 285-86, 326 A.2d at 111-12.
80 Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 342 A.2d 886 (Law Div. 1975), overruled
in part, Puttrich v. Smith, 170 N.J. Super. 572, 576, 407 A.2d 842, 844 (App. Div.
1979).
81 Id. at 170-71, 342 A.2d at 892-93. The court explained that the state's police
power cannot be wielded to the extent of destroying superior property rights unless there was a clear showing that its application was reasonably necessary in given
circumstances. Id. at 176-77, 342 A.2d at 896 (citations omitted). The court concluded, however, there had been no showing that the legislative objectives of
preventing unfair ouster of tenants
reasonably required inclusion of such a drastic provision that permanently precludes an owner from occupying, for his own use in good
faith, one of the rental units. Indeed, the continuation of such right
by owners would appear to have only limited effect on those goals
while preserving the historic concept of property rights even in modern day society ....
Id. at 177, 342 A.2d at 896.
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would be an uncompensated taking and a violation of the landlord's right to due process.82 The court therefore permitted the
eviction, but offered some suggestions to the legislature on how
to insulate the statute from future constitutional scrutiny. 3
Beyond the constitutional challenges to the Anti-Eviction
Act, the legislation clearly has afforded tenants much needed
protections against arbitrary and capricious evictions. 8 4 In interId. at 174-77, 342 A.2d at 895-97.
Id. at 177-78, 342 A.2d at 897. Later, the legislature heeded the court's advice and amended the Anti-Eviction statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(1)(2)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (providing for good cause for eviction if owner of a
building of three units or less seeks to personally occupy a unit, or has contracted
to sell the residential unit to a buyer who wishes to personally occupy it).
84 See, e.g., Village Bridge Apts. v. Mammucari, 239 N.J. Super. 235, 240, 570
A.2d 1301, 1304 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that landlord had burden of proof that
lease changes were reasonable, the court reversed trial court's order permitting
tenant's eviction where the landlord had not carried his burden); Durruthy v.
Brunert, 228 N.J. Super. 199, 203, 549 A.2d 456, 458 (App. Div. 1988) (although
recognizing that plaintiff-landlords could evict tenants if intending to personally
occupy tenant's unit, the court refused to order eviction where plaintiffs intent had
not been established), certif denied, 114 N.J. 482, 555 A.2d 607 (1989); Young v.
Savinon, 201 N.J. Super 1, 9-10, 492 A.2d 385, 390 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that
where there was no lease provision prohibiting pet ownership when lease was executed, it would be an unreasonable change in lease terms if prohibition was later
added to lease, thus removing any "good cause" that landlord may have had to
evict tenants); Diaz v. Perez-Tamayo, 251 N.J. Super. 513, 514-15, 598 A.2d 947,
947-48 (Law Div. 1991) (holding that there must be substantial violation of landlord's rules to constitute good cause for eviction within meaning of the Act, the
court denied landlord's attempt to evict tenant where landlord rule limited occupancy to three persons, but tenant violated rule when wife gave birth to a second
child); Pappas v. Huezo, 237 N.J. Super. 492, 494, 568 A.2d 145, 146 (Law Div.
1989) (holding that dentist who wanted to use apartment for office could not escape the restrictions of the Anti-Eviction Act because the Act exempted "owner
occupied premises with not more then two rental units" and using an apartment as
an office would not constitute "residential use" within meaning of statute); Chambers v. Nunez, 217 N.J. Super. 202, 207-08, 524 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Law Div. 1986)
(holding that landlord's conversion of building in manner that reduced number of
rental units from four to one was a conversion "not contemplated" by the AntiEviction Act and could not operate to remove the landlord from the constraints of
the Act and permit tenant evictions without cause); Gross v. Barriosi, 168 N.J.
Super. 149, 151, 401 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Dist. Ct. Passaic County 1979) (granting
tenant's motion to dismiss landlord's summary dispossess action where the spirit of
the Anti-Eviction Act, together with its literal application did not recognize as
"good cause" landlord's desire to "personally occupy" tenant's apartment as a
business office). Cf Harden v. Pritzert, 178 N.J. Super. 237, 241, 428 A.2d 927,
929 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that the Anti-Eviction Act could not be applied to
bar tenant's eviction where leased premise was a large farm upon which more than
one residential rental unit was located); Fargo Realty, Inc. v. Harris, 173 N.J. Super.
262, 266-67, 414 A.2d 256, 258-59 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that tenant-inflicted
damage and expense could properly be included as "rent," the non-payment of
which could establish good cause for eviction); Floral Park Tenants Ass'n v. Project
Holding, 152 N.J. Super. 582, 590, 378 A.2d 266, 270 (Ch. Div. 1977) (finding that
82
83
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preting the Act, courts occasionally have moved beyond the statute's plain language and underlying intent to provide tenants
with greater rights than were expressly required under the
statute.85
Despite these seemingly unlimited protections, the AntiEviction Act has been applied to traditional landlord-tenant relations only, effectively rendering the Act's protections meaningless in certain cases.86 While the Anti-Eviction Act clearly reveals
a legislative intent to give residential tenants some security with
respect to housing, New Jersey's judiciary has refused to apply
the Act to bar mortgagees from evicting a defaulting mortgagor's
tenants.87
B.

New Jersey's Judiciary Strictly Construes the Act: The Guttenberg
Decision

The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Guttenberg Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Rivera,8 8 held that the state's Anti-Eviction Act applied
only to traditional landlord-tenant relations. 89 As a result, Guttenberg Savings and Loan Association, which held a mortgage on
the Anti-Eviction Act was not intended to prevent temporary relocation of tenants
for the purpose of renovating existing housing, the court permitted temporary tenant relocations, despite the absence of "good cause" as defined by the statute while
the tenants' building underwent rehabilitation), aff'd sub nom. Project Holding, Inc.
v. Smyth, 166 N.J. Super. 355, 399 A.2d 1033 (App Div. 1979), certif denied, 81 N.J.
278, 405 A.2d 823 (1979).
Though New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act apparently serves as a beacon of hope
for the state's residential tenants, anti-eviction legislation is not without its critics.
See, e.g., Laura L. Westray, Note, Are Landlords Being Taken By The Good Cause Eviction
Requirement?, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 343-66 (1988) (arguing that anti-eviction laws
result in uncompensated takings of personal property for public use).
85 See, e.g., RWB Newton Assoc. v. Gunn, 224 N.J. Super. 704, 709-10, 541 A.2d
280, 283 (App. Div. 1988) (despite overwhelming evidence that tenant failed to
comply with landlord's regulations the court held that landlord had not complied
with Anti-Eviction Act's notification of termination provisions, despite landlords
letters warning of termination, and denied landlord's right to evict tenants).
86 Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1297
(1981).
87 See id. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292 (holding that landlords' mortgagees could
evict landlords' tenants without establishing good cause).
88 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289 (1981).
89 Id. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292. In tune with its re-affirmation of common law
principles, the court was careful to add that the Anti-Eviction Act did not apply to
"mortgagee[s] holding a lien prior to the leasehold of a tenant in possession." Id.
In so holding, the court refused to construe the Act broadly. Id. Justice Schreiber
criticized the appellate division for broadly construing the statute premised on a
finding that it was remedial in purpose. Id. at 627-28, 428 A.2d at 1295. According
to Justice Schreiber, the appellate division had been misled by the "interpretive
guide that remedial legislation be liberally construed," and accordingly substituted
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an apartment building but had not entered into a "traditional"
landlord-tenant relationship with the mortgagor's tenants, was
permitted to evict the building's leaseholders without good cause
restraints. 90
Permitting the mortgagee to do what the landlord could not,
in effect placing place status over substance, 91 produces an
anomalous result.9 2 Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme
its judgment for that of the legislature by applying the statute to unintended objects. Id.
Despite Justice Schreiber's criticism, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
changed directions in recent years. See 447 Associates v. Miranda, 115 N.J. 522,
529, 559 A.2d 1362, 1365 (1989) ("In establishing tenants' rights to continued occupancy of their rental dwellings the Anti-Eviction Act is remedial legislation deserving of liberal construction.") (citations omitted); A.P. Development Corp. v.
Band, 113 N.J. 485, 506, 550 A.2d 1220, 1231 (1988) (7-0 decision) ("Nonetheless,
the Legislature intended the Act to be remedial and to be liberally construed, particularly in view of the continuing critical shortage of affordable housing in this
state."); Royal Assoc. v. Concannon, 200 N.J. Super. 84, 93, 490 A.2d 357, 362
(App. Div. 1985) (holding that the Act was to be strictly construed, the court stated
its preference to view the Act "as remedial legislation recognizing tenants' continuing right to occupancy of their rented quarters-their homes. As such, this legislation should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose."). But see Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619 A.2d 241, 247
(App. Div. 1993) (ruling that the legislature's failure to unequivocally refer to foreclosing mortgagees in the statutory language of the amended Act evinced a legislative intent to exclude foreclosing mortgagees from the Act's scope), certif granted,
No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
90 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 633, 428 A.2d at 1298. Setting forth "well settled" principles of mortgagor-mortgagee relations in New Jersey, the court explained the
common law view that "[s]o long as the mortgage was prior to the tenancy, the
mortgagee, upon default, could foreclose on the leasehold and obtain an order for
possession against the mortgagor's tenant." Id. at 626-27, 428 A.2d at 1294 (citations omitted). The court scrutinized the Anti-Eviction Act's language and concluded that because the mortgagee had well established rights in New Jersey, the
state legislature's failure to modify these rights in "some straightforward manner"
precipitated the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to modify those
rights by prohibiting eviction of the defaulting mortgagor's tenants absent good
cause. Id. at 627, 428 A.2d at 1295. Cf Cornelio, supra note 9, at 363-64 (arguing
that the Anti-Eviction Act is a remedial statute, the author explained that the legislature's use of the word "owner" evinced an intent to include even those outside
the traditional landlord-tenant relationship within the Act's restrictions).
91 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman,J., dissenting) ("It is
obviously of no matter to an evicted tenant if he loses his home, through no fault of
his own, because of arbitrary conduct on the part of his original landlord or because a mortgagee has foreclosed on a mortgage loan extended to that landlord.").
92 See Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 171 N.J. Super. 418, 423, 409
A.2d 816, 819 (App. Div. 1979) ("To give a secured creditor a greater right than
that of the landlord to evict non-offending tenants upon the landlord's financial
failure would be anomalous and would seriously thwart the legislative purpose."),
rev'd, 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289 (1981); see also Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 637,428 A.2d
at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the appellate division, the justice
explained that a troubling aspect of the majority's opinion was its "apparent belief"
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Court, in a 5-2 decision, re-affirmed common law principles and
permitted the mortgagee to evict the defaulting landlord's
tenants .

The Guttenberg fact pattern, although unique in some respects, resembled any ordinary foreclosure proceeding. 94 After
Guttenberg filed a two-count foreclosure complaint, the defendant tenants answered and moved to dismiss, arguing that the
Anti-Eviction Act insulated them from an eviction action. 95 The
that common law mortgagee rights are "sacrosanct and not subject to modification"); see also Cornelio, supra note 9, at 361-64, 380 (reasoning that mortgagees, as
well as landlords, ought to be included within the scope of Anti-Eviction
prohibitions).
93 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 633-34, 637, 428 A.2d at 1298-1300.
94 Id. at 620-23, 428 A.2d at 1291-92. During the pendency of the Guttenberg
foreclosure action, the mortgaged premises had been declared uninhabitable by the
City ofJersey City and was boarded up. Id. at 622, 428 A.2d at 1292. Furthermore,
the property had already been conveyed to a third party subsequent to Guttenberg's purchase of the premises at a foreclosure sale authorized by the chancery
division. Id. Nevertheless, the supreme court decided to address the merits of the
case because of the tenant's continuing desire to inhabit the premises, the appellate
division's reported opinion on the public importance of the issues presented by the
case, and the tenants' filing of a notice of lis pendens prior to Guttenberg's conveyance to a third party (thereby depriving the third party of bona fide purchaser status). Id. at 622-23, 428 A.2d at 1292. Plaintiff Guttenberg Savings & Loan held a
$30,000 mortgage on an eight unit apartment complex located in Jersey City, New
Jersey. Id. at 620, 428 A.2d at 1291. When the mortgagors defaulted, Guttenberg
filed a two count complaint in the chancery division, seeking to foreclose on the
premises and take possession. Id. Because Guttenberg wanted the premises in vacant condition, in addition to the mortgagors, their successors, assigns and potential judgment creditors, Guttenberg also named five tenants in possession whose
tenancies had begun subsequent to the execution of the mortgage as parties defendant. Id.
A tenant is a necessary party to a foreclosure action; if not joined, the tenant's
interests in the mortgaged property cannot be extinguished. SHARON RIVENSON
MARK & RAYMOND I. KORONA, 23 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE § 2311 (1990); see also
Ellveeay Newspaper Ass'n v. Wagner Market Co., 110 N.J.L. 577, 580, 166 A. 332,
333 (1933) (adopting rule requiring joinder of tenants in foreclosure action);
American-Italian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Liotta, 117 N.J.L. 467,471, 189 A. 118, 120
(1937) ("unless a tenant is made a party defendant to the foreclosure suit his interest is unaffected thereby.").
95 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 620, 428 A.2d at 1291. The tenants also claimed dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim. Id.
The chancery judge disagreed with the tenants' argument. Id. Explaining that
the Anti-Eviction Act "amended and supplemented" New Jersey's Summary Dispossess statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (West 1952), the court reasoned that
the state legislature did not contemplate the application of the Anti-Eviction Act to
actions other than summary dispossess actions. Guttenberg Savings & Loan v. Rivera, 165 N.J. Super. 201, 203, 397 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Ch. Div. 1979), rev'd, 171 N.J.
Super. 418, 409 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289
(1981). Accordingly, the court utilized the common law maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed and held that the Anti-Eviction Act did not apply to foreclosing mortgagees seeking to evict a defaulting
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chancery judge denied the motion, however, ruling that the AntiEviction Act's good cause restraints did not include foreclosing
mortgagees.9 6 Eventually, the court awarded Guttenberg final
possession and ordered a sale of the mortgaged premises.9 7
Thereafter, in a unanimous decision, the appellate division
reversed and held that Guttenberg was subject to the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints.98 Because foreclosure was not
one of the good causes enumerated in the Act, the appellate division held that the tenants could not be evicted. 9 9 The New Jersey
Supreme Court disagreed, however, and reversed the appellate
division.' 00
Writing for the majority, Justice Schreiber rigidly interpreted the Anti-Eviction legislation.' 0 ' Justice Schreiber's analysis focused upon the Act's plain language, °2 its placement within
landlord/mortgagor's tenants. Guttenberg, 165 NJ. Super. at 203-04, 397 A.2d at
1128. The court arrived at this decision by examining the language of the Act,
concluding that there was no indication that the state legislature intended to modify mortgagees' well-settled common law rights to possession. Id.at 204, 397 A.2d
at 1128.
96 Id. The court stated that "there being no indication whatsoever that the
draftsman intended to interfere with a mortgagee's right to possession, it appears
that the required strict construction of the statute compels the conclusion that it
does not apply to the case at hand." Id.
97 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 621, 428 A.2d at 1291. Subsequent to the chancery division's denial of tenants' motion to dismiss, a flurry of procedural activity ensued.
See id. at 620-22, 428 A.2d at 1291-92 (setting forth the procedural history of the
case). Eventually, the chancery division granted Guttenberg's motion to strike the
tenants' answer and granted summary judgment in favor of Guttenberg. Id. A final
judgment was rendered by the chancery division, setting the debt due on the mortgage at $19,796. Id. at 621, 428 A.2d at 1291. Accordingly, the chancery judge
ordered the property sold. Id.
98 Guttenberg Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 171 N.J. Super. 418, 409 A.2d
816, 819 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1287 (1981). In so holding,
the appellate division explained that it would be anomalous to give an "eyes open"
lender greater rights than the borrower, in this case, the tenants' landlord. Id. at
423, 409 A.2d at 819. Furthermore, in finding that the legislature clearly intended
to limit the judiciary's authority to remove residential tenants, the court explained
that the Act should be read to effectuate its overall purpose. Id.
99 Id.
100

Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 633-34, 428 A.2d at 1300.

101 Id. at 623, 428 A.2d 1292.
102 Id. In scrutinizing the language of the Anti-Eviction Act, the court noted that
the Act's repeated references to "landlord" and "tenant" offered an indication that
the legislature intended to target landlord tenant relationships with the legislation.
Id. If the legislature intended to modify the legal relationship of all who shared an
incidental contact with tenants, the court explained, "the Legislature would have
used a broader terminology"' Id. Significantly, the court also pointed out that N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 "prohibits a landlord, and only a landlord, from evicting a
tenant except for good cause as stated in section 61.1." Id. at 624, 428 A.2d at
1293. In 1986, the New Jersey Legislature amended § 61.3 to prohibit not only
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New Jersey's statutory framework,' 0 3 and the Act's legislative history, 10 4 including remarks made by the Act's drafters. 0 5 This
analysis prompted Justice Schreiber to conclude that the Act's
good cause restraints applied only to traditional landlord-tenant
relationships. 0 6
"landlords" or "owners" from evicting tenants absent good cause, but also the
landlord or owner's successor in ownership or possession. Act of Oct. 29, 1986
(Anti-Eviction Act), ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West). Whether the
amended Anti-Eviction Act overrules Guttenberg, however, is open to question. But
see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619 A.2d
241, 247 (App. Div. 1993) (ruling that the New Jersey State Legislature's failure to
modify explicitly the rights of foreclosing mortgagees with the amended Anti-Eviction Act was dispositive of a legislative intent to exclude mortgagees from the
amended Act's scope), certif granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
103 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 624, 428 A.2d at 1293. The court pointed out that the
Act was located within the statutory framework governing landlord-tenant proceedings. Id. Because "statutes must be understood in their relation and interaction
with other laws which relate to the same subject or thing," the Anti-Eviction Act's
inclusion as part of New Jersey's rules regulating landlord-tenant relations led the
court to conclude that the Anti-Eviction Act was directed only at such traditional
relationships and not others. Id.
104 The court quoted the legislative statement attached to the Anti-Eviction act,
noting that the statement referred to inhibiting only landlords from acting arbitrarily in their relations with tenants. Id. at 625, 428 A.2d at 1293-94. Furthermore,
the court referred to the legislative hearings on the Anti-Eviction legislation, pointing out that the hearings focused upon landlord abuse of tenants, but no mention
was made of mortgagees' abusive conduct. Id. at 625-26, 428 A.2d at 1294. Thus,
the court concluded that "[t]he manifest legislative purpose of the Act was to curb
abuses and inequities in landlord tenant relations." Id. at 625, 428 A.2d at 1294.
105 Id. at 623-25, 428 A.2d at 1292-94. The court supported its conclusion by
noting that the drafters of the legislation interpreted the Act in a manner that
would not include foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's good cause restraints on
the eviction of residential tenants. Id. (citation omitted). See infra notes 141, 144,
162, 164, 166 (setting forth legislators' extraneous statements with regard to the
purported legislative intent manifested within the amended Anti-Eviction Act).
106 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 625, 428 A.2d at 1293. Justice Schreiber explained:
The frequent and consistent references in the Anti-Eviction Act to
tenants and landlords, the imposition on landlords alone of the duty
to give a demand and notice for possession, the restriction against
evictions except for "good cause" placed only on landlords, the carving out of the summary landlord-tenant eviction proceedings of residential tenancies and relocation of those dispossess proceedings in
the Anti-Eviction Act, and the placement of these provisions within
the statutory scheme relating to proceedings between landlord and
tenant, are cumulative indicia of the legislative intent that the AntiEviction Act would apply only where a landlord-tenant relationship
exists.
Id.
One must ask, however, why the court dwelled on the technical interpretations
of the Act's language instead of interpreting the legislation in a manner consistent
with its overall purpose, i.e., to prevent tenants from being unfairly and arbitrarily
ousted from their living quarters. See supra note 13 (explaining that the underlying
motive for enacting the Act was a legislative recognition that few, if any, restrictions
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Furthermore, Justice Schreiber explained that if the legislature intended to modify mortgagees' firmly embedded common
law rights, 0 7 the legislature would have done so in "some
straightforward manner."' 1 8 Therefore, the justice continued,
the legislature's failure to include language in the Act explicitly
modifying mortgagees' rights indicated a legislative intent to
leave mortgagees' common law rights unchanged. 0 9
Finally, Justice Schreiber utilized arguments submitted by
amici curiae in concluding that substantial reasons existed for
are placed upon those who seek to remove tenants from homes where tenants are
comfortable and have caused no problems).
Apparently, the court was concerned with the impact that a decision in favor of
the tenants would have upon mortgage lending. In fact, a considerable part of the
opinion addressed arguments presented by amici curiae concerning the potential
consequences of subjecting mortgage lenders to Anti-Eviction restrictions. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 631-33, 428 A.2d at 1297-98 (relying upon amici curiae, the court
explained that substantial reasons exist for treating mortgagees differently than
landlords: subjecting mortgagees to the Act's restrictions could result in a drying
up of mortgage funding and an overall deterioration of already deteriorated housing). The long-term implications of subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to anti-eviction restrictions are addressed infra at notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
107 For a complete discussion on the common law rights that mortgagees in New
Jersey retained, see supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
108 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 627, 428 A.2d at 1295.
109 Id. at 633, 428 A.2d at 1298. Justice Schreiber explained that upon and after
default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee was entitled to possession of the mortgaged premises. Id. at 626, 428 A.2d at 1294 (citations omitted). Because the legislature did not explicitly include mortgagees within the Act's provisions, the justice
concluded that the legislature did not intend to prohibit tenant evictions by foreclosing mortgagees after the mortgagor's default. Id. at 630-31, 428 A.2d 1296-97.
Apparently anticipating the New Jersey Supreme Court's reaffirmation of mortgagees' common law right to terminate subsequent tenancies upon foreclosure, the
tenants countered with their own common law argument. Id. Contending that they
had "attorned" to the mortgagee because they were ready and willing to pay rent to
Guttenberg, the tenants explained that their relation to the mortgagee had been
transformed into one of landlord and tenant. Id. at 630, 428 A.2d at 1296. The
court explained, however, that mortgagees' right to rent did not accrue until the
mortgagee took actual or constructive possession of the mortgaged premises, and
even then, the tenants were not obliged to pay rent to the mortgagee until the
mortgagee demanded rent. Id. The court explained that attornment occurred only
when the mortgagee requested rent and the tenant complied. Id. Finally, Justice
Schreiber concluded by pointing out that no landlord-tenant relationship could exist until the mortgagee took possession and consented to taking on the occupants
of the mortgaged property as tenants. Id. at 630-31, 428 A.2d at 1296-97. Because
neither element was present in this case, the court held that no attornment had
occurred and that tenants were liable to be ejected by the mortgagee. Id. Justice
Schreiber's reasoning suggests that mortgagees will be subject to the Anti-Eviction
Act, as amended in 1986. The amended Act states that not only landlords, but also
their successors in ownership or possession, must establish good cause before
evicting residential tenants. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp.
1992).
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treating mortgagees differently than landlords." 0 The justice
reasoned that mortgagees should not be held to the Anti-Eviction Act because doing so might bind mortgagees to a mortgagor-landlord's improvident leases with tenants."' Despite this
reasoning, Justice Schreiber also emphasized that there may be
some instances where a lease enhances mortgaged property's
value." 2 The justice posited, however, that whether the leases
110 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 631-33, 428 A.2d at 1297-98. The court criticized the
appellate division for "substitut[ing] its wisdom and judgment for that of the Legislature" in concluding that there were no differences between a defaulting mortgagor-landlord, whose interest lay primarily in the "cash flow of the enterprise," and
mortgagees, who are primarily interested in obtaining security for the mortgagors'
debts. Id. at 631, 428 A.2d at 1297.
The New Jersey Supreme Court permitted the Savings Bank Association of
New Jersey (Savings Bank), Applied Housing Associates of Hoboken, New Jersey,
(Applied Housing), and the NewJersey Savings League (Savings League), to intervene as amici curiae. Id. at 622, 428 A.2d at 1292. The Savings League argued that
including mortgagees within the restrictions of the Anti-Eviction Act would result
in an overall decrease in mortgage funding. Id. at 631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297. The
Savings League explained that mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) required, in some circumstances, that buildings with less than five
units be delivered to the insuring agency in vacant condition as a condition precedent to receiving the insurance proceeds. Id. at 631, 428 A.2d at 1297. Because
mortgagees would not always be able to conform with this condition if subjected to
the Anti-Eviction Act, the Savings League explained that less lending would result:
if the mortgagee could not receive insurance for its risk, it would be less willing to
lend. Id.
Furthermore, Applied Housing argued that including mortgagees within the
Anti-Eviction Act would cause banks lending money for housing rehabilitation to
stop making loans. Id. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1297-98. In addition, Applied Housing
argued that banks holding mortgages on deteriorated housing would simply write
off the mortgages and allow the mortgagors to totally abandon repairs on the buildings, thus raising the possibility of constructive eviction of the buildings' tenants.
Id. Applied Housing explained that banks would follow such a course because they
did not want to become involved in running apartment housing. Id. Thus, if the
mortgagor defaulted upon a mortgage, banks assuming possession of the property
would prefer simply to write off the mortgage as a loss rather than invest new capital for repairs. Id.
III Id. at 632-33, 428 A.2d at 1298. The court pointed out that a landlord may
enter into "long-term leases having insufficient inflationary protections, with leases
having a cash bonus up front or with 'sweetheart' leases." Id. The court, however,
failed to take into account, as Justice Pashman did in dissenting, that a lease
subordinate to the mortgage is extinguished upon foreclosure by the mortgagee.
Id. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300. Therefore, although tenants ought to be permitted to
remain in possession following foreclosure unless good cause is established, mortgagees can nevertheless enter into a new agreement with the tenant, provided that
it is fair and not unconscionable. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(f) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1992). Significantly, the Anti-Eviction Act, as amended in 1986, explicitly
notes that landlords' successors in ownership or possession retain their common
law rights to modify pre-existing leases. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b)(3) (West
1987 & Supp. 1992).
112 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 633, 428 A.2d at 1298.

1038

SE TON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1006

add value to the mortgaged premises would not be known until
the actual foreclosure sale, and even then, the property's true
value can not be determined unless and until the property is of13
fered with and without the tenants in possession.
Consequently, the majority concluded that mortgagees were
not included within the good cause restrictions of New Jersey's
Anti-Eviction Act." 4 The court explained that mortgagees would
become subject to the Anti-Eviction Act's restraints if the mortgagee entered into a traditional landlord relationship with the
defaulting mortgagor's tenants.'15
Justice Pashman, joined by Justice Handler, dissented from
the majority opinion, asserting that the majority ignored and undermined the Act's broader purposes." 6 Agreeing with the court
113 Id.; see also Hensel, supra note 15, at 326-28. The author explained that the
concept of marshalling, wherein the foreclosing mortgagee is entitled to extinguish
subordinate interests only after the mortgagor's resources were depleted, could accommodate the competing interests of the Anti-Eviction Act and the mortgagee's
desire to preserve the value of its security. Id. at 326. In particular, the author
proposed that the two funds doctrine be used in "Guttenberg-type situation[s]."
Id. at 327. The two funds doctrine may be employed where the mortgagor owns
two or more separate pieces of property, with at least one subject to a first mortgage, and others subject to first and second mortgages. Id. at 326. Upon the mortgagor's default, the two funds doctrine requires that the senior mortgagee proceed
solely against the property subject to his mortgage. Id. at 326-27. Thereafter, the
mortgagee could proceed against the other properties only if the foreclosure on the
parcel subject only to its mortgage was insufficient to cover the mortgagor's debt.
Id.
The author explained that the two funds doctrine could be applied to a Guttenberg-type situation if the mortgagor-landlord's property was viewed as two separate and distinct properties: one with the tenants remaining and one vacant. Id. at
327. At a foreclosure sale the properties would be offered for sale with the tenants,
and without the tenants. Id. If the sale price with tenants remaining would satisfy
the mortgage debt, then the tenants should be allowed to remain. Id. If, however,
the sale price did not satisfy the debt, and the sale price on a vacant home was
considerably larger, then the property should be sold in vacant condition. Id.
114 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 633, 428 A.2d at 1298. The court explained:
The statutory language, the Act's location in the statutory scheme,
and the legislative history, coupled with the legislative silence relative
to the traditional law governing the rights of a mortgagee against a
defaulting mortgagor and those having subordinate interests in realty,
lead inevitably to the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend
that the Act affect a mortgagee's rights.
Id.; cf. Cornelio, supra note 9, at 363 (explaining that subjecting mortgagees to good
cause restraints would be consistent with the apparent legislative intent manifested
in anti-eviction legislation).
''5 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1298.
116 Id., 428 A.2d at 1298-99 (Pashman,J., dissenting). Justice Pashman examined
the Statement appended to Assembly Bill 1586, and concluded that the legislature
clearly intended to prohibit arbitrary tenant evictions, no matter who the evictor
was. Id. at 635, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The justice explained:
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that resolution of the case turned upon an interpretation of the
legislature's intent, Justice Pashman attacked the majority's strict
interpretation of the Act."1 7 The justice explained that the statute was remedial legislation and should have been broadly construed.'" 8 Therefore, the justice maintained, even if the Act was
ambiguous in its terms, the ambiguities ought to be construed in
favor of the class that the Act was intended to protect, i.e. blameless tenants.'

'9

Justice Pashman also criticized the majority's "apparent belief" that mortgagees' common law rights were not subject to
modification.120 Thejustice explained that mortgagees' common
"It is obviously of no matter to an evicted tenant if he loses his home, through no
fault of his own, because of arbitrary conduct on the part of his original landlord or
because a mortgagee has foreclosed on a mortgage loan extended to that landlord." Id. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman,J., dissenting). In addition, the justice criticized the majority's argument that the frequent use of "landlord" in the act
evinced a legislative intent to prohibit only mortgagees from evicting tenants absent good cause. Id. at 635, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Because
the term "landlord" was not defined in the Act, the justice questioned why the term
should be construed to mean only the person who originally entered into the lease
with the tenant. Id. In addition, Justice Pashman examined the Act's language,
concluding that the legislature's use of both "owner" and "landlord" in several
instances evidenced the legislature's intent to protect tenants not only against the
person who originally entered into the lease with the tenant, but also from those
outside the landlord-tenant relationship, i.e., purchasers at a foreclosure sale. Id.
According to Justice Pashman, "the statutory language indicate[d] that the Legislature intended the act to cover all persons who had a common law right to evict a
tenant." Id.
Finally, Justice Pashman explained why a construction of the Act including
mortgagees would be harmonious with the Act's overall purpose. Id. at 636, 428
A.2d at 1299-1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Quoting the statute, Justice Pashman
observed that in light of the legislature's obvious intent to safeguard non-offending
tenants: "The concern of the statute is not the status of the party seeking the eviction, but the power of the court to order an eviction." Id.
117 Id. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1298-99 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 636, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The majority responded to Justice Pashman's call to interpret the Anti-Eviction Act broadly and as
remedial legislation by observing that the liberal construction rule should not be
used to distort the legislature's intent or to apply the legislature's words to unintended entities. Id. at 627, 428 A.2d at 1295. Furthermore, the majority explained
that the judiciary could only effectuate legislative intent; courts were not authorized
to legislate and devise protective measures. Id. at 628, 428 A.2d at 1295.
119 Id. at 636, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman,J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice Pashman explained that mortgagees who loaned money and took back a mortgage on a residential apartment building "d[id] so fully aware that there may be tenants living there
in the event of foreclosure at some future time and that its rights of foreclosure may
be restricted by conflicting legal rights of the tenants." Id. at 636, 428 A.2d at 1300
(Pashman, J., dissenting). According to the dissenting Justice, persons having an
interest in property are affected by the Anti-Eviction Act if they happen to lease to a
tenant. Id. at 636-37, 428 A.2d at 1300. (Pashman,J., dissenting). Justice Pashman
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law rights must yield when the state exercises its police power to
provide for the public safety and welfare. 12 ' Despite this explanation, Justice Pashman also recognized the problems inherent
in subordinating mortgagees' common law rights to a tenant in
possession under a lease subordinate to the mortgage. 12 2 In response, the justice reaffirmed the common law principle that
leases created subsequent to the execution of a mortgage are
subordinate to that mortgage and extinguishable upon foreclosure. 12 3 Justice Pashman maintained, however, that foreclosure
would not operate to remove tenants from the Act's protections. 121 While the lease might be extinguished by foreclosure,
prothe justice explained, the tenant remained within the 1Act's
25
tections and could not be evicted absent good cause.
Justice Pashman concluded that
broad, social legislation.' 26 According
ture intended to reduce tenants' fears
lose their homes through no fault of

the Anti-Eviction Act is
to the justice, the legislathat they could suddenly
their own.' 27 Consistent

explained: "The act affects the rights of an owner, whose interests in the property
are clearly greater than those of a mortgagee." Id. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman,J., dissenting). Thus, the justice concluded that subjecting mortgagees to the
restraints of the Anti-Eviction Act would not result in unfairness to mortgagees. Id.
at 636, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
121

Id.

See id. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (explaining that a
lease entered into subsequent to a mortgage is subordinate to the mortgage and is
extinguished upon foreclosure, giving rise to a periodic tenancy between the foreclosing mortgagee, or any person gaining title subsequent to foreclosure, and the
tenant).
123 Id. The implications of allowing a tenant to remain in possession despite the
tenant's notice of a pre-recorded mortgage has been addressed by commentators.
See Hensel, supra note 15, at 324 (concluding that the appellate division's decision
subjecting mortgagees to Anti-Eviction restraints "elevated tenancies which arise
after a mortgage above the priorities scheme of the recording acts .... in complete
derogation of the recording act policy that a first-in-time interest in realty has priority") (citation omitted).
124 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
125 Id. Justice Pashman's reasoning has been adopted and codified by the New
Jersey Legislature. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992)
(stating that where the landlord or owner's successor in ownership or possession is
not bound by the lease entered into by the landlord with the former tenant and
would be able to offer a different lease to the tenant, nothing in the Anti-Eviction
Act shall impair that right). Thus, the legislation implicitly recognizes that foreclosure may extinguish a lease subsequent to a mortgage. Although the tenancy
agreement is extinguished, the tenant remains protected by the Anti-Eviction Act's
good cause restraints on eviction.
126 Guttenberg, 85 NJ. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
127 Id.; see also Cornelio, supra note 9, at 363 (arguing that anti-eviction legislation
required an inclusion of mortgagees within the legislation's good cause restraints
on eviction to effectuate its intent).
122
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with this observation, Justice Pashman asserted that tenants
should not lose their homes during times of acute housing
shortages merely because a mortgagee foreclosed on a mortgage
28
secured by the tenants' leasehold residence.
C.

Guttenberg's Aftermath

Despite Justice Pashman's vigorous dissent, the Guttenberg
court allowed the foreclosing mortgagee to evict the defaulting
mortgagor's tenants. 29 An atypical decision for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, 3 especially in light of legislation clearly
designed to protect residential tenants, Guttenberg paved the way
for New Jersey's current rash of foreclosure-related tenant evictions.' 3' In fact, a recent appellate division decision has ensured
that these evictions will continue. 132 Nevertheless, there are
some indications that the New Jersey State Legislature intended
33
Guttenberg's reign to end. 1
Nearly five years after the Guttenberg decision, the New Jersey
128 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (Pashman,J., dissenting). Moreover, commentators have noted the tragic consequences of removing tenants arbitrarily from homes. See Bell, supra note 9, at 483 (explaining that the involuntary
removal of tenants from leasehold residences can be "devastating, depriving the
tenant of both physical and emotional security").
129 Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292.
130 See id. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman, J., dissenting) ("the [anti-eviction]
act is a direct response to the Legislature's concern for the 'critical shortage of
rental housing space in New Jersey,' . . . a concern which, at least until today, this
Court shared") (citation omitted). With Guttenberg, the NewJersey Supreme Court
retreated from its earlier status as a forerunner in modernizing tenants' rights. See,
e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970) (ruling that tenants could deduct the cost of necessary repairs to leasehold residence from rent
due and owing where landlord failed to make the repairs after receiving notice);
Reste Realty Co. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 461, 251 A.2d 268, 276-77 (1969) (implying a warranty of habitability into commercial leaseholds); see also Note, supra note
19, at 570 & nn.26-29 (explaining Marini and judicial innovations in New Jersey
landlord-tenant law).
131 See Rosin, supra note 2, at 588 (reviewing the dramatic increase in foreclosurerelated tenant evictions taking place in Essex County, NewJersey).
132 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 435, 619 A.2d
241, 245 (App. Div. 1993) (determining that the amended Act did not apply to
foreclosure-related evictions because the Act failed to explicitly identify foreclosing
mortgagees as falling within the Act's good cause restraints on eviction), certif.
granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
133 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West)
(amending the Anti-Eviction Act, the legislation both expands the scope of the Act
and provides a mechanism wherein foreclosing mortgagees would be able to receive a maximum on security for mortgagors' debts); see also infra notes 141, 144,
162, 164, 166 (discussing the comments made by legislators who drafted the
amendment). But see Chase Manhattan, 261 N.J. Super. at 439-40, 619 A.2d at 247
(stating that the legislators' statements were made four years after the legislation
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Legislature amended the Anti-Eviction Act.13 4 The amendment
focuses upon inhibiting the strategic eviction of tenants pursuant
to a plan to convert residential apartments to condominiums. 135
Despite this primary focus, the legislation also contains amendments that are relevant to Guttenberg's strict interpretation of the
Anti-Eviction Act. 13 6 Inferentially, this legislation demonstrates
1 37
the legislature's intent to overrule Guttenberg.
D. An Interpretationof the Amended Act
An analysis of the amended Act indicates that the NewJersey
Legislature intended to include foreclosing mortgagees within
the Act's scope.' 3 8 The legislature remedied those portions of
had been drafted and pointing out that such statements "afforded little or no guidance to the court") (citations omitted).
134 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, § 138, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 32 (West) (stating
the title of the amendment, "An Act to prevent the use of certain pretexts that
cause tenants to vacate premises .... "); see also id. at 41, § 7 (West) (setting forth
the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act in uncodified form); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (representing the codified version of the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act).
135 Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 10(a)-(d), N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 42-43 (West)
(explaining that the high demand and short supply of residential housing in New
Jersey has resulted in "attempts to displace tenants employing pretexts, stratagems
or means other than those provided pursuant to the intent of State eviction laws").
Id. at 10(b). These legislative findings were eventually codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.la (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
136 Compare Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 623-24, 428
A.2d 1289, 1292-93 (1981) (supporting decision that the unamended Anti-Eviction
Act applies to landlord-tenant relationships only by examining the consistent references to "landlords" and "tenants" contained in the Act) with Act of Oct. 29, 1986,
ch. 138, §§ 7, 9, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:18-61.2 & -61.3 by mandating that the Act is to be liberally construed and
expanding the Act's scope to include not only landlords, but also their successors
in ownership or possession within the Act's good cause restraints on eviction).
137 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623-24, 428 A.2d at 1292-93 (restricting the unamended Anti-Eviction Act's scope to cover landlord-tenant relations only because
statutory language was specifically directed to "landlords" and "tenants"). The
narrowness of the Act's language shaped the Guttenberg court's decision to construe
strictly the unamended Anti-Eviction Act. Id. As amended, however, the Anti-Eviction Act will apply to situations arising outside the context of traditional landlordtenant relationships. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp.
1992) (stating that residential tenants "may not be removed by any order or judgment for possession from the premises by the owner's or landlord's successor in
ownership or possession" except for cases where good cause can be established).
In light of the broadened scope of the amendment, the inference is inescapable that
the legislature intended to overrule Guttenberg's narrowing of the Act's applicability
to traditional landlord-tenant relations only.
138 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (stating, in the section's last clause, that
an owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession who is not bound by
the predecessor's leases, and who may offer a new lease to the tenant, shall con-
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the Act that the Guttenberg court found dispositive in refusing to
include foreclosing mortgagees within the unamended Act's
scope.' 39 Although a recent lower court decision reached a different conclusion, 140 these amendments indicate that the legislathe Guttenberg court's interpretation of
ture intended to overrule
14 1
the unamended Act.
For instance, section seven of the amendment broadened the
Act's scope to include not only landlords, but also the landlords'
or owners' successors in ownership or possession within the legislation's good cause restraints on eviction. 4 2 This broadening
tinue to have that right). This latter provision addresses the Guttenberg court's fears
that subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints could result in mortgagees being bound to mortgagor-landlords' improvident leases. See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1298. The inclusion of this
clause is convincing evidence that the New Jersey Legislature was cognizant of the
Guttenberg court's fears. Moreover, the clause indicates that the legislature sought
to encourage the judiciary to construe the Act broadly. In light of the clause's implicit messages, it is clear that foreclosing mortgagees should be included within
the amended Act's good cause restraints on eviction.
139 Compare id. at 623-26, 627-28, 632, 428 A.2d at 1292-94, 1295, 1298 (refusing
to utilize the interpretive maxim that remedial legislation should be broadly construed, the court reasoned that the unamended Act's consistent reference to landlords and tenants precluded the inclusion of mortgagees within the Act's scope,
especially in light of the fact that such an interpretation of the Act could result in
foreclosing mortgagees becoming bound to defaulting mortgagors' improvident
leases) with Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, §§ 7(b), 9, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 4142 (West) (amending the original Act and expanding the scope of the Act's good
cause restraints to include not only landlords or owners, but also their successors in
ownership or possession; providing that the mortgagor's successor in ownership or
possession will not be bound to his successor's leases, if the predecessor would not
otherwise have been so bound; mandating that the amendment is to be liberally
construed to effectuate its purposes).
140 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619
A.2d 241, 247 (App. Div. 1993) (determining that the amended Act did not apply to
foreclosure-related evictions because the Act failed to explicitly identify foreclosing
mortgagees as falling within the Act's good cause restraints on eviction), certif
granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
141 See Defendants' Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment A, at
2, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, No. F-9447-89, N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Essex
County, February 3, 1992 (certification of Honorable Byron M. Baer) (explaining
that as author of § 7 of Senate Bill no. 1912, (Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 32 (West) amending the Anti-Eviction Act and eventually enacted
as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992)), his intention was to
overrule Guttenberg); see also Defendants' Motion at B, B(1) (certification of Honorable Christopher J. Jackman) (explaining that as sponsor of Senate Bill no. 1912, the
Senator fully concurred in the certification of Assemblyman Baer and fully comported with the understanding of the Bill stated by Assemblyman Baer in his
certification).
142 Compare Act ofJune 25, 1974, ch. 49, § 4, 1974 N.J. Laws 122 (stating, in the
Act's unamended form, that "[n]o landlord may evict, or fail to renew any lease of
any premises covered by ... [the Anti-Eviction Act] except for good cause as de-
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of the statutory language bears directly upon the Guttenberg
court's finding that the unamended Act's consistent references to
"landlords" and "tenants" was dispositive of a legislative intent
to limit the Act's applicability to traditional landlord-tenant relationships. 143 The amended Act's applicability to situations arising outside of the landlord-tenant relationship evidences the
144
legislature's intent to negate Guttenberg's ruling.
Section nine of the amendment, directly contrary to the Guttenberg court's strict interpretation of the unamended Act, mandates that the Anti-Eviction Act and its 1986 amendment be
liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of the legislation. 145 Therefore, even if foreclosing mortgagees are not infined . . . [by the Anti-Eviction Act]) with Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West) (amending § 4, the legislation stated that "[a] person
who was a tenant of a landlord in premises covered by [the Anti-Eviction Act] may
not be removed by any order or judgment for possession from the premises by the
owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession except . . . [for good cause].").
This section of the amedment is codified in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3.
143 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623, 428 A.2d at 1292; see also supra note 139 and
accompanying text for a comparison of the Guttenberg court's narrow construction
of the unamended Anti-Eviction Act with the 1986 amendment to the Act.
144 See Defendants' Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment A, at
2, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, No. F-9447-89, N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Essex
County, February 3, 1992 (certification of Honorable Byron M. Baer) (explaining
that § 7 of the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act was authored
with the intent to overrule Guttenberg).
145 See Act of Oct. 9, 1986, ch. 138, § 10(g), 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 44 (West)
(stating that the Anti-Eviction Act and "[tlhis 1986 amendatory and supplementary
act shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof"). This liberal
construction clause was added to the statute as an historical note. NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.2 cmt. (West 1987); see also supra note 139 (detailing the tension between the liberal construction clause and the Guttenberg decision). Although the
liberal construction mandate is quite clear, whether the Anti-Eviction Act, as
amended, must be liberally construed to apply to foreclosing mortgagees is uncertain. For example, the 1986 Amendment's primary purpose was to discourage
landlords' use of stratagems or pretexts to evict non-offending tenants while not
complying with the unamended Act. Act of Oct. 9, 1986, ch. 138, § 8, 1986 N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 42-44 (setting forth the legislature's findings and purpose for
amending the Anti-Eviction Act). Given the amendment's primary purpose, New
Jersey courts might be tempted to follow Guttenberg's lead by strictly interpreting
the amended Act and ruling that the liberal construction clause applies only to interpretations of the Act triggered by landlords' use of stratagems to evict tenants.
See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 627-28, 428 A.2d 1295 (warning that the interpretative
maxim "remedial legislation is to be liberally construed" could not be used to distort legislative intent and apply legislation to unintended subjects). In this scenario, the amended Act would not be liberally construed as a general proposition and
foreclosing mortgagees would again escape the Act's eviction restraints. This result is unlikely, however, because the Act's various components, when read together, evince a clear legislative intent that the Act afford tenants the greatest
possible protection. See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138 § 10(b), 1986 N.J. Sess. Law
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cluded within the statutory language of "owner's or landlord's
successor in ownership or possession," the legislature's directive
allows a court to construe the Anti-Eviction Act to include fore4 6
closing mortgagees within the Act's good cause restraints.
Additionally, the last clause of section seven of the amendment offers a further indication of a legislative intent to overrule
Guttenberg.147 Section seven addresses the Guttenberg court's fear
that subjecting mortgagees to good cause restraints on eviction
might bind foreclosing mortgagees to the defaulting mortgagorlandlord's disadvantageous leases.1 4 8 Erasing this possibility, the
Serv. 42 (West) (stating that "in order to protect the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens of New Jersey," § 10(g) of the Act appears to require a judicial
interpretation of the Act that will provide residential tenants with the broadest possible protections against arbitrary or capricious evictions). But see id. at 627, 428
A.2d at 1295 (stating that if the legislature intended to modify mortgagees' fundamental property rights, the legislature "would have done so in some straightforward manner"); see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428,
435, 619 A.2d 241, 245 (App. Div. 1993) (ruling that the amended Act did not
include foreclosing mortgagees within the legislation's good cause restraints), certif.
granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
146 Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). In applying this provision
of the Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees, a controversy may develop with
respect to whether the mortgagee, after the mortgagor's default, automatically became the mortgagor's successor in possession. See City Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n
v.Jacobs, 188 N.J. Super. 482, 486, 457 A.2d 1211, 1213 (App. Div. 1983) (explaining that even though the mortgagee becomes entitled to possess mortgaged premises following default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee cannot be forced to take
possession; the final judgment in a foreclosure proceeding awarding possession to
the mortgagee merely recognized the mortgagee's right to take possession and did
not require that possession be assumed by the mortgagee). Furthermore, the mortgagee does not become the owner of the mortgaged premises until the mortgagor's
equity of redemption is foreclosed by sale. Id. at 487, 457 A.2d at 1213-14 (stating
that prior to a foreclosure sale, the mortgagor retains an ownership interest in
mortgaged property as the owner of the equity of redemption).
147 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West)
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 1987)) (stating
that "[w]here the owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession . . . is
not bound by the lease entered into with the former tenant and may offer a different lease to the former tenant, nothing in this 1986 amendatory and supplementary
act shall limit that right"); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1992) (codifying this provision of the amendment).
148 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 627, 632, 428 A.2d at 1295, 1298 (supporting decision to strictly construe the unamended Act by explaining that an application of the
Act to foreclosing mortgagees might bind mortgagees to mortgagors' improvident
leases and that the existence of such disadvantageous leases may substantially devalue the mortgagees' security interest in the mortgaged property). But see Cornelio, supra note 9, at 369 (explaining that because the value of a multiple unit
building is usually a function of the rent income produced, the value of mortgagees' security interest in such buildings would not be diminished if the tenants were
paying market prices for rent). Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 &
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clause provides that the amendment can not prevent the owner
or landlord's successor from offering a new lease to the tenant if
the landlord's successor in ownership or possession was not
bound by the landlord's lease.14 9
Because neither foreclosing mortgagees nor third party foreclosure purchasers will be bound by the defaulting mortgagor's
leases, section seven allows either party to offer new leases to the
mortgagor's former tenants. 150 The defaulting mortgagor's successor, however, will not be permitted to evict the tenants absent

good cause. 151
Supp. 1992) (stating that even though the Anti-Eviction Act applies to an owner's
or landlord's successor in ownership or possession, if the successor is not bound by
the predecessor's leases, the successor may offer a new lease to the predecessor's
tenants; therefore, a mortgagor's successor in ownership or possession could raise
the rent of the mortgagor's tenants to reflect current market value); see also supra
notes 24-28, 32-34 and accompanying text (explaining situations at common law
where mortgagees or their successors will not be bound to the defaulting mortgagor's leases).
149 An Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). This "escape" provision of the amended Act, permitting mortgagees or third party foreclosure purchasers to escape from defaulting mortgagors' leases, balances mortgagees' rights
to security with residential tenants' need for housing. As such, this balancing device provides the answers to questions regarding the amended Act's constitutionality as applied to foreclosing mortgagees. See infra notes 169-202 and accompanying
text (discussing potential impairment of contract and takings challenges to an application of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees).
150 Id. Under the common law, leases created subsequent to the execution of the
mortgage were subordinate to the mortgage and extinguished upon default by the
mortgagor. Keech v. Hall, 99 Eng. Rep. 17, 18 (1778). Conversely, leases created
prior to the execution of a mortgage were superior to the mortgage and were unaffected by the mortgagor's default, provided that the tenant attorned to the mortgagee. Moss v. Gallimore, 99 Eng. Rep. 182, 183 (1779). These common law rules
were adopted in New Jersey. Thomas v. DeBaum, 14 N.J. Eq. 37, 39 (1861); Betts
v. Wurth, 32 N.J. Eq. 82, 85 (1880). These principles should govern the operation
of § 7 and should determine whether a mortgagor's successor in ownership or possession would be permitted to offer a new lease to the defaulting mortgagor's former tenants. See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41
(West); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (stating that
where the owner or landlord's successor in ownership or possession is not bound
by the predecessor's leases, nothing in the amendment shall limit the successor's
right to offer a new lease to the former landlord's tenants); see also supra notes 2534, 44-59 and accompanying text (explaining the common law rules with respect to
the mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle and their subsequent adoption in New
Jersey).
151 Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West). Section 7 of the 1986 amendment adopts Justice Pashman's suggestion that upon default by the mortgagor, leases that are subordinate to the mortgage are
extinguished. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 637, 428 A.2d at 1300 (PashmanJ., dissenting).
The tenants, however, remain protected by the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints on eviction. Id.
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E. A Preliminary Evaluation of the Amended Act's Scope
In amending the Act, the New Jersey State Legislature
targeted the Guttenberg decision and supplemented the Act to require an inclusion of foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's
scope. 15 2 Interpreting the Act in such manner would comport

with the legislature's intent in enacting the original Act in
1974 3sas well as the decisions of other jurisdictions construing
similar legislation.154
152 See supra note 136 for a comparison of the amended Anti-Eviction Act with
the provisions of the unamended Act that the Guttenberg court found dispositive of a
legislative intent to limit the Act's applicability to traditional landlord-tenant relationships. See Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment
A, at 2, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, No. F-9447-89, NJ. Super. Ct., Ch. Div.,
Essex County, Feb. 3 1992 (certification of Honorable Byron R. Baer) (explaining
that § 7 of the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act was drafted with
open-ended terms to provide the broadest possible protections for residential tenants). Furthermore, Assemblyman Baer explained that the terms of the amendment were left open-ended as a safeguard against a narrow judicial interpretation
of the Act, limiting the Act's protections to only that which the statutory language
specifically identified. Id. But see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J.
Super. 428, 439-40, 619 A.2d 241, 247 (App. Div. 1993) (determining that the
amended Act did not apply to foreclosure-related evictions because the Act failed
to explicitly identify foreclosing mortgagees as falling within the Act's good cause
restraints on eviction), certif granted, No. 4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
153 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (setting forth the text of the New
Jersey State Legislature's statement accompanying the passage of the Anti-Eviction
Act and explaining that the prime motivation in enacting the legislation was the
legislature's desire to provide tenants with some protection against eviction in cases
where tenants are comfortable in homes wherein they reside and have caused no
problems); see also Cornelio, supra note 9, at 372 (arguing that the legislative intent
manifested in New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act could best be satisfied by including
foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's prohibitions on eviction); Guttenberg, 85
N.J. at 634, 428 A.2d at 1299 (Pashman,J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's
decision to exclude foreclosing mortgagees from the operation of the Anti-Eviction
Act because such an interpretation "not only ignores its [the Act's] broader purposes but actually undermines them .... ").
This article's reliance upon Justice Pashman's dissenting opinion in Guttenberg
is ironic, forJustice Pashman twenty years ago remarked: "Because the law must be
an instrument for justice, yesterday's dissent is today's law review article urging
tomorrow's promises of the necessary capacity for growth to meet changing needs.
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just." Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 324, 293 A.2d 720, 741
(Law Div. 1972) (citation omitted), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d
312, appeal after remand, 72 N.J. 412, 371 A.2d 34 (1977).
154 See Gross v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that purchaser at trustee's sale, who was the second mortgagee, could not
evict the defaulting mortgagor's tenants unless the purchaser could establish good
cause pursuant to Rent Control Ordinance). The court explained that even though
the purchase was necessary to protect the mortgagee's security interest, the tenants
could not be evicted because foreclosure and sale were not recognized as good
causes for eviction under San Francisco's Rent Control Ordinance. Id. at 289. See
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Nevertheless, the legislature's failure to explicitly include
foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's scope leaves room for
mortgagees to argue that the amended Act does not apply to
foreclosure-related evictions. 55 If the amended Act is applied to
foreclosing mortgagees, the legislature's omission creates a
number of constitutional,' 5 6 public policy' 5 7 and property law isalso Administrator of Veterans' Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1170 (D.C.
1985) (per curiam) (holding that Washington D.C.'s Rental Housing Act prohibited
mortgage insurer from evicting defaulting mortgagor's tenants where mortgagee
purchased property at foreclosure sale, subsequently conveyed the property to the
insurer, but good cause for eviction pursuant to the Act could not be established).
The Valentine court rejected the insurer's argument that the mortgagor's tenants
should be evicted so that the Veterans' Administration, as insurer of the mortgage,
could resell the property to cover its reimbursement of the mortgagee. Id. at 1170
& n.9. The court explained that the Veterans Administration failed to set forth any
substantial reason why it, as insurer, should be treated any differently than ordinary
owners of property. Id.; see also Kelley A. Baione, Survey, The District Of Columbia
Rental Housing Act: Eviction Protection For The Tenants Of A DefaultingMortgagor Under
Administrator Of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 1133, 1148
(1986) (criticizing the Valentine court for failing to recognize that holding mortgage
insurers to anti-eviction legislation might deplete mortgage funding). Cf Guttenberg,
85 N.J. at 631-33, 428 A.2d at 1297-98 (supporting decision to exclude foreclosing
mortgagees from the operation of Anti-Eviction legislation by discussing some reasons that exist for treating mortgagees differently than landlords).
155 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 627, 428 A.2d at 1295 (explaining that if the state
legislature intended to modify mortgagees' well-established property rights with
the Anti-Eviction Act, the legislature "would have done so in some straightforward
manner"). But see Defendants' Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment A, 2 8, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, F-9447-89, N.J. Super. Ct., Ch.
Div., Essex County, February 3, 1992 (certification of Honorable Byron M. Baer)
(stating that the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act was intended to include
foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's restraints on eviction; according to Assemblyman Baer, the Act was deliberately left open-ended in order to provide for the
Act's application to "the broadest possible situations"). Id. Cf Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619 A.2d 241, 247 (App. Div.
1993) (finding the NewJersey State Legislature's failure to explicitly identify foreclosing mortgagees as falling within the amended Act's good cause restraints on
eviction to be dispositive of a legislative intent to exclude foreclosing mortgagees
from the Act's scope), certif granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
156 The Guttenberg court intimated that applying the unamended Anti-Eviction Act
to foreclosing mortgagees would violate the impairment of contracts provisions of
both the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions. Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 632 n.7, 428
A.2d at 1298 n.7. In addition, commentators have demarked potential "takings"
challenges to New Jersey's unamended Anti-Eviction Act. See Note, supra note 19,
at 574-82 (discussing possible taking challenges to New Jersey's unamended AntiEviction Act).
157 The Guttenberg decision was influenced by the court's fear of the long term
effects of subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause
restraints on eviction. See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1297-98. Specifically, the court was concerned that the imposition of eviction restraints on foreclosing mortgagees would have the long term effect of decreasing mortgage funding in
New Jersey. Id. at 631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297.
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sues.158 If mortgagees are successful in arguing any one of these
issues, Guttenberg's strict construction of the unamended Act
would be reaffirmed, despite the legislature's apparent intent to
overrule the decision. 5 9 Accordingly, a proper analysis of the
amended Anti-Eviction Act's applicability to foreclosing mortgagees demands an examination of each of these issues.' 60
III.

EXAMINING THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

A. Statutory Language Problems
The unamended Anti-Eviction Act's failure to explicitly address foreclosing mortgagees convinced the Guttenberg court that
the legislature did not intend to subject foreclosing mortgagees
158 See id., at 626-27, 428 A.2d at 1294-95 (determining that the unamended AntiEviction Act did not prohibit foreclosing mortgagees from evicting the defaulting
mortgagors' tenants absent good cause, the Guttenberg court recognized that mortgagees' security interests are normally superior to tenants' possessory interests in
the mortgaged property). In addition, commentators have observed that permitting tenants to remain in possession of mortgaged premises after the mortgagors'
default, because good cause cannot be established to support the eviction, creates a
conflict between New Jersey's Recording Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:21-1 (West
1952), and the Anti-Eviction Act. See Hensel, supra note 15, at 322-23 (arguing that
an application of the Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints to foreclosing mortgagees was inconsistent with New Jersey's Recording Act because tenants would be
given priority over mortgagees' superior, recorded interests).
159 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 623-33, 428 A.2d at 1292-98 (narrowly construing the
Anti-Eviction Act because of the unamended Act's narrow language and the court's
unwillingness to expand the Act's application to foreclosing mortgagees absent explicit direction from the state legislature). The amended Act's language has been
sufficiently broadened so that foreclosing mortgagees may be included within the
Act's restraints, but the state legislature failed to mention foreclosing mortgagees
or mortgagees' traditional common law rights when the legislature amended the
Act in 1986. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (illustrating that the amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act broadens the Act's language, but
fails to mention of foreclosing mortgagees). Therefore, a court may be unwilling to
apply the Act to foreclosing mortgagees until satisfied that an application of the Act
would not unduly interfere with mortgagees' rights. See Hensel, supra note 15, at
323 (criticizing the appellate division's decision to include foreclosing mortgagees
within the scope of the unamended Act, the author stated that the court's concern
for protecting tenants' rights resulted in the court's disregard for mortgagees'
rights); see also Guttenberg, 171 N.J. Super. 418, 423, 409 A.2d 816, 819 (App. Div.
1979) (holding that the unamended Anti-Eviction Act insulated residential tenants
from no-cause eviction by foreclosing mortgagee), rev'd, 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289
(1981). Accordingly, the constitutional, public policy and property law priority issues discussed below will play an important role in shaping courts' interpretations
of the amended Act.
160 See Hensel, supra note 15, at 323 (criticizing the appellate division's one-sided
analysis in Guttenberg, the author explained that the court's sympathy for tenants
who might be arbitrarily ousted from their housing quarters resulted in the court's
failure to protect mortgagees' traditional common law rights).

1050

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1006

to the Act's good cause restraints on eviction, especially in light
of the substantial impairment that an application of the Act might
have upon mortgagees' common law rights.' 6 1 Similarly, the
amended Act also fails to explicitly include mortgagees within
its restraints.' 62 As a result, mortgagees have a strong argument against applying the Act to foreclosure-related tenant
6 3
evictions. 1
Nonetheless, the amended Act differs substantially from its
predecessor in that it explicitly directs that the amendment be
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.'64 Unlike the legislative statement appended to the original Act, 165 the legislature's
161 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 626-27, 428 A.2d at 1294-95 (citations omitted). The
Guttenberg court explained:
Property law with respect to the rights of a mortgagee vis-a-vis a
subordinate tenant strongly supports our analysis of the legislative intent. It is not realistic to believe that the Legislature intended to modify that relationship by the Anti-Eviction Act without some reference
to mortgagees. . . . If the Legislature had intended to modify these
established fundamental property rights, it would have done so in
some straightforward manner.
Id.
162 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, Ch. 138, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41-42 (West)
(amending New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act and broadening its scope, but failing to
explicitly identify foreclosing mortgagees as falling within the Act's prohibition on
evictions absent good cause). But see Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment A, 2 8, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, F-9447-89, N.J.
Super. Ct., Ch. Div., Essex County, February 3, 1992 (certification of the Honorable Byron M. Baer) (explaining that the terms of the amended Act were deliberately
left "open-ended" to facilitate the Act's applicability to the broadest possible
situations).
163 Note, supra note 19, at 574. See supra note 145 (explaining the interpretative
dilemma caused by the sweeping language of the amended Act, its probable effect
on foreclosing mortgagees' common law rights, and the Legislature's failure to expressly modify mortgagees' rights when the Act was amended in 1986).
164 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 9, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 42 (West)
(mandating that both the Anti-Eviction Act and its 1986 amendment are to be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes); see also Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment A, 2 7, Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner,
F-9447-89, N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div., Essex County, February 3, 1992, (certification
of the Honorable Byron M. Baer) (explaining that the liberal construction clause
was inserted in the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act because the New
Jersey Supreme Court rejected a liberal interpretation of the Act in Guttenberg). Cf
Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 627, 428 A.2d at 1295 (ruling that interpretative guides holding that remedial legislation was to be construed liberally should not "be used as a
pretext for construing the word 'landlord' to include 'foreclosing mortgagees' ")
(citation omitted).
165 See supra note 13 (setting forth the text of the New Jersey State Legislature's
statement appended to Assembly Bill 1586 as part of the original enactment of New
Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act in 1974). NewJersey courts have frequently relied upon
this Statement in according residential tenants broad protections against arbitrary
or capricious evictions. See 447 Assoc. v. Miranda, 115 N.J. 522, 529, 559 A.2d
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inclusion of this liberal construction clause in the amendment explicitly authorizes a court to provide residential tenants with
comprehensive eviction protection. 6 6 In addition, the clause
pertains directly to Guttenberg-relevant legislation.' 67 Thus the
clause is insulated from mortgagees' assertions that the liberal
interpretation directive relates only to situations expressly contemplated by the amendment and not to foreclosure-related
16 8
evictions.
1362, 1365 (1989) ("[i]n establishing tenants' rights to continued occupancy of
their rental dwellings the Anti-Eviction Act is remedial legislation deserving of liberal construction") (citations omitted); A.P. Dev. Corp. v. Band, 113 N.J. 485, 506,
550 A.2d 1220, 1231 (1988) (7-0) ("[n]onetheless, the Legislature intended the Act
to be remedial and to be liberally construed, particularly in view of the continuing
critical shortage of affordable housing in this state"). The Guttenberg court, however, focused upon the Statement's references to "landlords" and "tenants" and
used the Statement as a device for limiting the unamended Anti-Eviction Act's applicability to landlord-tenant relationships only. See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 625-27,
428 A.2d at 1293-95 (quoting the Statement and emphasizing its references to
"landlords" and "tenants" the court later remarked: "The manifest legislative purpose of the Act was to curb abuses and inequities in landlord-tenant relations.").
166 Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and Reconsideration, Attachment A, 3 9,
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Werner, F-9447-89, N.J. Super. Ct., Chancery Div., Essex
County, February 3, 1992 (certification of the Honorable Byron M. Baer) (certifying
that the intent of the drafters of the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction
Act was to give comprehensive protections to tenants including protection against
eviction by foreclosing mortgagees). Assemblyman Byron M. Baer stated:
I can say with reasonable certainty that my views reflected those of the
bill's sponsors. The bill itself related primarily to the abuses which
were occurring when owners of buildings sought to convert their
property to condominiums. Many such owners were seeking to remove tenants in these buildings without affording the tenants the
rights granted them by the Eviction for Cause Act and the Senior Citizens and Disabled Tenancy Act. We felt banks and other mortgagees that
acquire multi-family dwellings throughforeclosure should not be in any better
position to evict tenants than ordinary landlords.
Id. (emphasis added)
167 See supra note 136 (pointing out that the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's
Anti-Eviction Act pertains directly to provisions of the unamended Act that the Guttenberg court found dispositive of a legislative intent to limit the Act's applicability
to traditional landlord-tenant relationships).
168 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 9, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 42 (West).
The legislature's insertion of a liberal construction clause in the 1986 amendment,
without more, would appear to warrant a liberal interpretation of the Act for the
purpose of inhibiting landlords from employing pretexts or stratagems, i.e., condominium conversions, to evict tenants contrary to the state's Anti-Eviction legislation. Compare NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2 cmt. (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (stating
that the Anti-Eviction Act and its 1986 amendment are to be liberally construed in
order to effectuate their purposes) with N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-61.la (West 1987) (indicating that the primary purpose of the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act was to
inhibit landlords or owners from circumventing tenants' eviction protections by
employing pretexts or stratagems such as condominium conversions as a means for
evicting tenants) and legislature's Statement appended to Assembly Bill 1586
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ConstitutionalIssues

An application of the Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees may also evoke claims of unconstitutionality.' 69 The Guttenberg court noted that requiring foreclosing mortgagees to
establish good cause for eviction may unconstitutionally impair
contracts under both the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions.' 7 0 Similarly, commentators have observed that foreclosing
(1974), supra note 13 (indicating that the original, unamended Anti-Eviction Act was
designed to prevent residential tenants' arbitrary or capricious evictions). Cf Guttenberg, 85 NJ. at 625, 428 A.2d at 1293-94 (relying upon the Statement in limiting
the unamended Act's applicability to traditional landlord-tenant relations only).
In amending the Act in 1986, the legislature went beyond protecting tenants
against landlords' "back-door" evictions by broadening the Act's terms and adding
statutory provisions allowing landlords' successors to avoid the landlords' disadvantageous leases. See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 NJ. Sess. Law Serv.
41 (West); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-61.3 (West 1987) (permitting successors to alter
leases if not otherwise prohibited by the lease). If Guttenberg's interpretative gloss is
removed from the unamended Act and the Act as a whole is read in conjunction
with the amendment's liberal interpretation clause, it becomes clear that the Act
should be interpreted to provide tenants with protections against arbitrary and capricious evictions that are broad enough to extend beyond traditional landlordtenant relations. See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 9, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 42
(West); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2 cmt. (West 1987) (mandating that the amendment be liberally construed). Consistent with this interpretation, foreclosing mortgagees would be precluded from evicting residential tenants absent good cause.
169 See Note, supra note 19, at 574 (setting forth constitutional objections to the
amendments). See supra notes 77-83 (setting forth landlords' constitutional objections to anti-eviction legislation and New Jersey courts' near uniform rejection of
these challenges). Despite the New Jerseyjudiciary's rejection of landlords' claims,
mortgagees' constitutional objections to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act, although
meritorious, have not yet been litigated. See, e.g., Guttenberg Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 631, 632 & n.7, 633, 428 A.2d 1289, 1297, 1298 & n.7
(1981) (noting, but not deciding, foreclosing mortgagees' potential impairment of
contracts claim against an application of the Anti-Eviction Act, the court reasoned
that there are substantial reasons for differentiating between landlords and mortgagees for the purpose of applying the unamended Act).
170 Id. at 632 n.7, 428 A.2d. at 1298 n.7. The court's observation is rooted in
foreclosing mortgagees' potential claim that a retroactive application of the AntiEviction Act's good cause restraints on eviction would impair mortgage agreements
entered into with the mortgagor, agreements which presupposed that the mortgagee would receive property in vacant condition as security for the mortgage loan.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting the impairment of contractual obligations);
see also N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, par. 3 (1947) (similarly prohibiting the New Jersey
Legislature from passing any law that would impair the obligation of contracts and
adding that the state may not deprive an individual of any remedies for enforcing a
contract, provided that the remedy was in existence at the time the contract was
created). But see Edgewater Inv. Assoc. v. Borough of Edgewater, 201 NJ. Super.
267, 277 n.4, 493 A.2d 11, 16 n.4 (App. Div. 1985) (commenting that New Jersey
does not apply a different or more narrow construction of the state constitution's
Contract Clause than that utilized by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution), affd, 103 N.J. 227, 510 A.2d
1178 (1986). In Chase Manhattan v. Josephson, the court noted that a retroactive ap-
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mortgagees could have potential "takings" claims if subjected to
7

anti-eviction legislation. '

1. Impairment of Contracts
New Jersey's courts have rejected impairment of contract arguments with respect to retroactive applications of the Anti-Eviction Act's protected tenancy provisions. 72 These rejected
challenges pertained to landlords' relations with tenants. 173
plication of the Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees may violate the contract clauses of the state and Federal Constitutions as well as mortgagees' due
process rights. Chase Manhattan v. Josephson 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619
A.2d 241, 247-48. But, because the court determined that the amended Act was
not intended to overrule Guttenberg, the court did not reach these potential constitutional infirmities of the amended Anti-Eviction Act. Id.
171 See, e.g., Note, supra note 19, at 574-80 (pointing out landlords' potential takings claims against New Jersey's then newly enacted Anti-Eviction Act); Cornelio,
supra note 9, at 376-80 (setting forth "takings" criteria articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court and concluding that an application of these standards revealed that
anti-eviction legislation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking when applied
to foreclosing mortgagees); Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction ProtectionAnd The Takings
Clause, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 925 (1989) (offering comprehensive analysis of U.S.
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence and articulating potential outcomes of landlords' takings challenges to anti-eviction legislation); see also Westray, supra note 84,
at 323 (concluding that good cause eviction requirements permitted a permanent
occupation of landlords' property and therefore constituted uncompensated takings under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
172 See Edgewater, 201 N.J. Super. at 277-80, 493 A.2d at 16-18, (holding that a
retroactive application of New Jersey's Senior Citizens and Disabled Tenancy Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.22 to -61.39 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992), did not constitute an unconstitutional impairment of contract where the statute permitted courts
to grant protected tenancy status to the landlord's tenants even after a valid conversion plan had already been filed); see also Troy LTD. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 294-98
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding that an application of the Senior Citizens and Disabled
Tenancy Act did not create an unconstitutional impairment of contracts where a
retroactive application of the Act prohibited the purchaser from evicting the former
owner's tenants).
In Troy, Troy LTD. sold an apartment complex to East Coast Condo Tech,
Inc., and, in return, took back a mortgage. Id. at 293. Interestingly, Troy's and East
Coast's complaint in this case averred that an application of the Anti-Eviction Act's
Protected Tenancy provisions to tenants occupying condominium units would result in a "diminution in the value of the complex as security for any mortgage, and
an impairment of the ability to obtain further financing on these units." Id. The
court did not explicitly address the issue, but interestingly the court's takings analysis indicates that the court might have been willing to permit some diminution in
the security's value because the diminution would have been the result of a valid
exercise of the state's police power. See id. at 301-02. But cf Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at
631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297-98 (suggesting that the potential impairment of value of
the mortgagee's security was a reason for differentiating between landlords and
mortgagees with respect to an application of the Anti-Eviction Act).
173 Edgewater, 201 N.J. Super. at 272-74, 493 A.2d at 13-14; Troy LTD., 727 F.2d
at 293-94.
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There have been no reported New Jersey cases, however, examining the impairment of contracts issue in the context of the
mortgagor-tenant-mortgagee triangle. 7 4 Nevertheless, the principles applied to landlord-tenant impairment of contract claims
75
are equally applicable to mortgagees' claims.'
The impairment of contract doctrine was originally applied
to post-Revolutionary War state legislatures' attempts to annul
local debtors' obligations to British creditors.1 76 The impairment
of contracts clause of the United States Constitution does not,
however, pose an obstacle to the states' power to enact social or
economic legislation affecting private contracts.' 77 The legisla174 See supra notes 177-78 & 180 (demonstrating that New Jersey's courts have
questioned whether an application of the Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosure related
evictions would violate the constitutional interdiction of impairment of contracts
and "takings" of private property for public use, but have never answered these
questions).
175 See Troy Ltd., 727 F.2d at 296 (analyzing an impairment of contract claim, the
court focused on the identity of the parties to the contract and explained that where
the state was a party to a contract, courts impairment of contract analyses required
a "more exacting standard of scrutiny," than required for a purely private contract). Accordingly, there is no need to distinguish between foreclosing mortgagees and landlords to determine the appropriate standard of impairment of
contract review. Because the state is not a party to mortgagees' agreement with the
mortgagors, the principles applicable to landlords' impairment of contract arguments will also control mortgagees' potential claims.
176 Troy Ltd., 727 F.2d at 294. Judge Gibbons's opinion offered some interesting
background information on the origins of the United States Constitution's Impairment of Contracts Clause:
The contract clause is among those provisions of the Constitution addressing post-Revolutionary War state legislation purporting to repudiate obligations owed by local debtors to British and loyalist
creditors. A number of states had, in evident violation of article IV of
the 1783 Treaty of Peace . . . enacted laws staying the time for payment of debts, making paper money legal tender, and sequestering
debts due British creditors ....
Thus, article I, section 10 of the Constitution forbade the states from coining money, emitting bills of
credit, making anything but gold and silver a tender for the payment
of a debt, and "impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1) (citations omitted); see also Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. NewJersey Highway Auth., 85 N.J. 277, 286, 426 A.2d 488, 493 (1981)
(providing some further background information on the Contract Clause, i.e., that
during the nineteenth century, the Contract Clause was used by the United States
Supreme Court "more than any other Constitutional provision to invalidate state
legislation."), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804 (1981).
177 See, e.g., Fidelity Union Trust, 85 NJ. at 286, 426 A.2d at 493 (asserting that the
Impairment of Contracts Clause could not be interpreted so as to prohibit the state
from enacting laws designed to serve the public interest); Edgewater, 201 N.J. Super.
at 277, 493 A.2d at 16 (explaining that a literal construction of the contract clause
would be inconsistent with the public interest because such a literal interpretation
would deprive the state of any means of self-protection: "[Tihe State retains
residual authority to enact laws 'to safeguard the vital interests' of its people.")
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tion will pass constitutional scrutiny only if it addresses a legitimate end and employs means that reasonably and appropriately
effectuate its purposes.' 7 8 Courts have employed a three-pronged inquiry in implementing this test. 179 Specifically, courts
have questioned: 1) whether a contractual impairment existed; 2)
whether the impairment could be justified by a legitimate and
significant public purpose; and 3) whether the impairment was
based on reasonable conditions and was sufficiently related to the
appropriate government objective. 80
Measured against these standards, applying the Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees would not unconstitutionally
impair contracts.' 8 ' Even assuming that a retroactive application
of the Act would impair a mortgagee's security agreement with a
defaulting mortgagor, 8 2 the Act's legitimate purpose of accord(citations omitted); Troy Ltd., 727 F.2d at 296 (observing that the contract clause, as
recent United States Supreme Court cases indicated, placed only limited inhibitions
on state legislatures' ability to enact laws that address social problems but affect
existing contractual relations between two parties).
178 Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934). In Blaisdell, the Court confronted mortgagees' impairment of contract challenge to Minnesota's mortgage moratorium law, which extended the redemption period for
mortgages. Id. at 415-16. The Court rejected the mortgagees' constitutional challenge, ruling that Minnesota's exercise of its police power to provide for the public
health and safety was appropriate in light of the state's housing problem. Id. at
444-45, 447. See also Cornelio, supra note 9, at 374-75 (concluding that Minnesota's
mortgage moratorium law had a greater impact on contractual rights than would an
application of anti-eviction legislation to foreclosing mortgagees).
179 Troy, 727 F.2d at 296-97.
180 Id. In addition, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
added a gloss to the last prong of the test. Id. The Troy court pointed out that
courts must determine whether legislative modification of private contracts is based
on reasonable conditions and is "of a character appropriate to the public purpose
justifying [the legislative] adoption." Id. Courts must also " 'defer to legislative
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.' " Id. (citations omitted).
181 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 374-75 (concluding that the application of antieviction legislation to foreclosure-related tenant evictions should not constitute a
violation of the United States Constitution's Impairment of Contract Clause). But
see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 438, 440, 619 A.2d
241, 246, 247-48 (App. Div. 1993), certif granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6,
1993). Reaffirming Guttenberg's observation that an application of New Jersey's
Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees may unconstitutionally impair contracts, theJosephson court indicated that even if the amended Anti-Eviction Act was
interpreted to include foreclosing mortgagees, the impairment of contracts issue
might be dispositive in determining that the Act still would not apply to foreclosing
mortgagees. Id.
182 Mortgagees' impairment of contract claims would have to demonstrate that
tenants' remaining in possession of the mortgaged property, through the operation
of the amended Anti-Eviction Act, would result in a substantialimpairment of mortgagees' contractual rights to security for mortgagors' debts. Troy LTD., 727 F.2d at
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ing residential tenants security in a dismal New Jersey housing
market substantially relates to the imposition of eviction for
297; see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400, 410-12 (1983). The Energy Reserves Court explained:
The severity of the impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny
to which the legislation will be subjected ... Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a finding of substantial impairment.... On the other hand, state regulation that restricts a party
to gains it reasonably expected from the contract does not necessarily
constitute a substantial impairment ....
In determining the extent of
the impairment, we are to consider whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.
Id. at 411.
Applying these principles to mortgagees' potential impairment of contract
claims, it appears that an application of the amended Act to foreclosing mortgagees
might not even reach the threshold level of "substantial" impairment. As noted
above, the last clause of § 7 of the 1986 amendment to the Anti-Eviction Act would
permit the mortgagor's successor to renegotiate the defaulting mortgagor's leases
and therefore raise tenants' rent to reflect market value. See Act of Oct. 29, 1986,
ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3
(West 1987); see supra notes 144, 146-47 (discussing the operation and effect of § 7
of the 1986 amendment). Although this option might theoretically increase, or at
least stabilize, the value of the mortgagee's security to reflect its fair market value,
the practical effect of allowing the defaulting mortgagor's tenants to remain in possession may not be known "until the property is sold, and then only if it has been
offered with and without the leaseholds." Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 633, 428 A.2d 1289, 1298 (1981). Under this line of reasoning,
the viability of mortgagees' "substantial impairment" argument would remain intact and a court would next consider whether the other two prongs of the impairment of contract test are met. See Troy, 727 F.2d 297-99 (considering first, whether
the plaintiffs' contracts were substantially impaired, and then, after finding that an
impairment arguably did not exist, passing to the other two prongs of the impairment of contract test).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Troy court emphasized that the landlord's successor (who was in the process of selling the condominium units but
could not sell some of the units because the Senior Citizen and Disabled Citizens
Protected Tenancy Act prohibited the tenants' removal) had bought into a heavily
regulated trade. See id. at 297 & n.8 (explaining that "an enlargement of an alreadyregulated statutory tenancy is probably not an impairment at all"). Similarly, a
mortgagee who accepts a multiple unit building as security for a mortgage loan in
New Jersey should be aware that tenants will occupy the units and that the State
heavily regulates landlord-tenant relationships. See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 370
("The mortgagee who lends to a mortgagor with residential property knows the
character of the property involved, and thus is in a position to evaluate the nature
of the risk it assumes."). In tune with this line of reasoning, a court may find that
there is no impairment of the "eyes open" mortgage lender's contract. See Guttenberg Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 171 N.J. Super. 418, 423, 409 A.2d 816,
819 (App. Div. 1979) (explaining that "[t]he mortgagee is almost always an 'eyesopen' commercial lender"), rev'd, 85 N.J. 617, 428 A.2d 1289 (1981). Utilizing such
reasoning in determining that there is no substantial impairment of mortgagees'
contracts, however, may deter mortgagees from lending in New Jersey. Guttenberg
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 85 N.J. at 631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297-98.
The lack of clear answers to these issues, coupled with the significant possibility that tenants' remaining in possession will have a detrimental impact upon the
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cause restraints upon foreclosing mortgagees. 83 Thus, New
Jersey's courts should not find an unconstitutional
impairment of
84
contracts if the Act is applied to mortgagees.
2.

Taking without Just Compensation

Alternatively, because the value of a mortgagee's security
could substantially diminish if tenants remain in possession of
the mortgaged property after the mortgagor's default,185 mortgagees may argue that the Act authorizes an unconstitutional taking
of property without just compensation.186 At the outset of this
section, it should be noted that amended Anti-Eviction Act does
not authorize a permanent, physical occupation of mortgagees'
security. 187 Accordingly, New Jersey's courts would analyze
value of mortgagee's security, will probably impel NewJersey's courts to pass to the
next two prongs of the impairment of contracts test.
183 See Troy, 727 F.2d at 298 (finding the New Jersey Senior Citizens and Disabled
Protected Tenancy Act's restraints on eviction and overall purpose of protecting
residential tenants from arbitrary and capricious evictions to be legitimate, reasonable and justified exercises of legislative power). Furthermore, the Troy court deferred to the legislature's determination that the eviction protections were a
reasonable means of attaining the tenant-protective ends envisioned by the legislation. Id.; see also Edgewater Inv. Assoc. v. Borough of Edgewater, 201 N.J. Super.
267, 280, 493 A.2d 11, 18 (App. Div. 1985) (noting the court's complete agreement
with the Third Circuit's opinion in Troy concerning this issue), aft'd, 103 N.J. 227,
510 A.2d 1178 (1986).
184 But cf Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 440, 619
A.2d 241, 247-48 (App. Div. 1993) (deciding the case based upon an interpretation
of the amended Anti-Eviction Act, the court nevertheless reiterated, but did not
decide, Guttenberg's questioning of whether an application of the Anti-Eviction Act
to foreclosing mortgagees would violate the impairment of contracts clause or
other due process rights of mortgagees), certif granted, No. 4052/6391-91 (April 6,
1993).
185 See Hensel, supra note 15, at 325 (noting the possibility that the value of mortgagees' security for mortgagors' debts may be decreased if the defaulting mortgagors' tenants are permitted to remain in possession of the mortgaged property).
But see Cornelio, supra note 9, at 369 (pointing out that permitting the defaulting
mortgagors' tenants to remain in possession would not decrease the value of the
mortgagees' security if the tenants were paying market value rent). Cf Act of Oct.
29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West) (allowing the mortgagor's successor to re-negotiate the predecessor's leases, thus providing an opportunity to receive market value rents); see also supra notes 146-47 (explaining the
operation of the last clause of § 7 of the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's AntiEviction Act).
186 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 376-78 (analyzing foreclosing mortgagees' potential takings arguments against an application of anti-eviction legislation to foreclosure-related evictions); see also Note, supra note 19, at 574-80 (discussing
landlords' potential takings claims against an application of the unamended AntiEviction Act to landlord-tenant relations).
187 See Note, supra note 19, at 575-77 (characterizing 1974 Anti-Eviction Act effect
as constituting a regulation rather than a taking).
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mortgagees' takings claims in accordance with the United States
Supreme Court's "regulatory takings" jurisprudence. 88 The judiciary would therefore examine the legislation's economic impact on foreclosing mortgagees, the legislation's interference
with mortgagees' investment-backed expectations and the character of the government action involved in applying the Act to
foreclosing mortgagees.189 Although courts would encounter
few obstacles in the governmental action prong of this test, the
other two prongs could present substantial difficulty.'
Foreclosing mortgagees' takings arguments would emphasize the potential economic hardship resulting from the defaulting mortgagor's tenants remaining in possession.' 9 ' The
188 See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528-31 (1992) (explaining that
to qualify for a physical occupation taking, the government must have required the
landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land). The Court further
outlined the contours of a physical occupation taking in FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,
where the Court explained that "Ithe line which separates [physical occupation
cases from others] is the unambiguous distinction between a . . . lessee and an
interloper with a government license." 480 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1987).
Although tenants are not interlopers, it is clear that mortgagees, who have not
"invited" the tenants to take possession, are being forced to accept the tenants'
possession against their consent. The Court has recognized, however, the states'
broad power to regulate housing conditions without having to compensate for
every resulting economic hardship. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). Accordingly, New Jersey courts would probably
eschew an application of the per se "physical occupancy" takings rule and instead
analyze mortgagees' taking claims with reference to the United States Supreme
Court's regulatory takings doctrine.
189 Cornelio, supra note 9, at 377. For a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case
employing these principles, see In re Plan for Orderly Withdrawal, 129 NJ. 389,
414, 609 A.2d 1248, 1262 (1992).
190 The character of the government action involved in anti-eviction legislation
can more readily be characterized as a government program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good than as a physical
and permanent occupation of an owner's property. See supra text accompanying
notes 187-89 and infra notes 191-95 (explaining that anti-eviction legislation does
not authorize a permanent, physical occupation of mortgagees' security). As a result, courts would most likely find that the character of government action involved
in an application of the Anti-Eviction Act to foreclosing mortgagees satisfies the
first prong of the regulatory takings test. See, e.g., In re Plan for Orderly Withdrawal, 248 N.J. Super. 616, 626, 591 A.2d 1005, 1010.(App. Div. 1991) (finding
that an insurance regulation requiring an insurer to "discontinue writing all other
lines of insurance as the price for discontinuing to write private passenger automobile insurance" passed the governmental action prong of the Court's takings analysis where the regulation could more readily be characterized as a government
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good than as a physical occupation), afd, 129 N.J. 389, 609 A.2d 1248 (1992).
191 See Hensel, supra note 15, at 325 (asserting that the value of mortgagees' security would be diminished if the defaulting mortgagor-landlord's tenants are permitted to remain in possession after default on the mortgage).
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economic value of multiple-unit apartment buildings, however, is
largely a function of the rent income produced.192 The amended
Act allows a foreclosure purchaser, either the mortgagee or a
third party, to renegotiate leases with the defaulting mortgagor's
former tenants.' 9 3 Thus the tenants' leases could be renegotiated to reflect the fair market value and render the mortgagee's
purported economic hardship largely illusory.' 94 Although this
renegotiation process may produce incidental expenses for the
mortgagor's successor, these expenses would not create an eco95
nomic hardship equivalent to an unconstitutional taking.'
Similarly, mortgagees would also encounter difficulty in convincing a court that an application of the amended Act interferes
with mortgagees' investment-backed expectations. 9 6 When
192 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 369 (pointing out that the value of a multiple
dwelling building is a function of the rent income that it produces).
193 Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (stating that where the
owner's or landlord's successor in ownership or possession is not bound by the
predecessor's leases, and may offer a new lease to the predecessor's tenants, nothing in the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act shall limit that right).
194 See id. Neither mortgagees nor third party foreclosure sale purchasers will be
bound by the defaulting mortgagor-landlord's leases, provided that the mortgage
preceeded the leases, or subsequent mortgagees bargained with the mortgagor to
subordinate pre-existing leases to the mortgage. See supra notes 44-59 (discussing
the common law principles applicable to the mortgagee-tenant-mortgagor triangle
and pointing out cases where third parties will not be bound to the defaulting mortgagor's leases with his tenants).
195 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 377 (illustrating that United State Supreme
Court taking decisions have not found takings even where the diminution in value
of the property in question was higher than 85% of its total value) (citing Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 405 (1915)).
196 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 378 (characterizing the investment-backed expectations prong of regulatory takings analysis as mortgagees' strongest argument
against an application of anti-eviction legislation to foreclosure-related evictions,
the author concluded that because an application of such legislation to foreclosing
mortgagees would not completely preclude any economic return on the mortgagee's security, a court would be unlikely to find that anti-eviction legislation interferes with mortgagees' investment backed expectations).
Additionally, however, there is some question as to whether tenants' remaining
in possession would even reach the threshold of interfering with mortgagees' investment backed expectations. See id. Under the amended Act, the defaulting
mortgagor's lease agreements will be extinguished upon foreclosure, giving the
foreclosure purchaser an opportunity to renegotiate the lease agreements while at
the same time eliminating the purchaser's potential overhead costs in acquiring
new tenants. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:18-61.3(b) (West 1987) (stating, in the last
clause of subsection (b) that in cases where a landlord's or owner's successor in
ownership or possession is not bound by the predecessor's lease and may offer a
new lease to the tenants, nothing in the amendment shall limit that right). Whether
the successor's option of renegotiation will actually enhance or stabilize the value
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agreeing to the mortgage loan, the mortgagee presumably understood that the loan was secured by a multiple-unit apartment
building that residential tenants would inhabit." 7 Additionally,
the mortgagee would also be aware of New Jersey's consistent
regulation of state housing for residential tenants.'
Moreover,
mortgagees had fair warning that legislative enactments might interfere with investment expectations due to court decisions regarding takings claims arising in other heavily regulated
businesses.' 9 9 Accordingly, mortgagees' arguments regarding
the frustration of investment-backed expectations through application of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act should be rejected.2 °0
New Jersey's judiciary should therefore reject foreclosing mortgagees' arguments that an application of the Anti-Eviction Act to
foreclosure-related evictions would constitute an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. 20 ' Thus,
with the failure of both the impairment of contracts and takings
arguments, the amended Anti-Eviction Act would pass constituof the mortgagees' security at market level, however, will "not be known until the
property is sold, and then only if it has been offered with and without the leaseholds." Guttenberg Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 NJ. 617, 633, 428 A.2d
1289, 1298 (1981). Accordingly, it appears that mortgagees will probably be able
to argue that an application of the amended Anti-Eviction Act interferes with mortgagees' investment-backed expectations.
197 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 370:
The mortgagee who lends to a mortgagor with residential property
knows the character of the property involved, and thus is in a position
to evaluate the nature of the risk it assumes. Certainly a mortgagee
who has made a loan on residential property cannot claim suprise [sic]
if, at foreclosure, there are still leases running.
Id.
198 See supra note 130 (discussing some examples of the innovative developments
in landlord-tenant law that were initiated by New Jersey's Supreme Court).
199 See, e.g., In re Plan for Orderly Withdrawal, 129 N.J. 389, 419, 609 A.2d 1248,
1264 (1992) (suggesting that insurer had fair warning that government regulation
may frustrate initial investment expectations); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984) (ruling that pesticide manufacturer who disclosed information to the Environmental Protection Agency had no reasonable investmentbacked expectation that its information would be kept confidential in light of the
great public concern and government regulation regarding the pesticide industry).
200 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 380 (stating that an inclusion of foreclosing
mortgagees within anti-eviction legislation would not constitute an uncompensated
taking for public use in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution). But see Westray, supra note 84, at 344 (arguing that anti-eviction legislation authorized a permanent, physical occupation of landlords' property without
just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
201 See supra notes 195 and 200 and accompanying text (discussing takings arguments based on economic hardship and interference with investment-backed
expectations).
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tional muster.20 2
C.

Prioritiesand Recordation Issues

Despite the failure of these constitutional attacks, foreclosing mortgagees could still argue that an application of the AntiEviction Act to foreclosure-related evictions irreconcilably conflicts with New Jersey's Recording Act.20 3 Given the judiciary's
steadfast policy of maintaining the integrity of New Jersey's Recording Act,20 4 the mortgagee's best argument against applying
the Act to foreclosure-related evictions is that such an interpretation would conflict with the Recording Act. 20 5 Applying the Act
202 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (suggesting some reasons why
foreclosing mortgagees' impairment of contract arguments should fail). Contrary
to the takings principles explored above, New Jersey courts might adopt less stringent methods of evaluating mortgagees' potential constitutional arguments. For
instance, in analyzing landlords' takings objections to the Anti-Eviction Act, New
Jersey's judiciary has consistently deferred to the state legislature's power to enact
programs designed to promote the common good. See, e.g., Edgewater Inv. Assoc.
v. Borough of Edgewater, 201 N.J. Super. 267, 280-82, 493 A.2d 11, 18-19 (App.
Div. 1985) (noting that, in response to condominium developer's takings claim
against an application of the Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy provisions of the Anti-Eviction Act, the Act constituted a permissible exercise of the
state legislature's police powers and could be applied where tenants would remain
in possession of converted residence, even after developer filed a conversion plan
and had earlier sought eviction before the Act took effect), afd, 103 N.J. 227, 234,
510 A.2d 1178, 1181-82 (1986). This deference to the state's police power may
find its roots in Justice Marshall's statement in Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter
CA TV Corp., regarding states' broad power to regulate landlord-tenant relationships
without the necessity of providing just compensation. Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). Nonetheless, this deference has
been recognized in the context of landlord-tenant relationships, but has not been
applied generically to all legislation aimed at protecting tenants. See Guttenberg
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Rivera, 85 N.J. 617, 631, 428 A.2d 1289, 1297 (1981)
(noting reasons for differentiating between landlords and mortgagees with respect
to applying the Anti-Eviction Act to attempted evictions of residential tenants).
New Jersey courts will probably apply the more stringent takings analysis set forth
above. See id.
203 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:21-1 (West 1989) (stating general principle of what is
commonly known as New Jersey's Recording Act, that a duly recorded conveyance
is notice to all of the recorder's interest in the subject property); see also Hensel,
supra note 15, at 323 (stating that an inclusion of foreclosing mortgagees within the
Anti-Eviction Act's restraints on eviction presented "an almost irreconcilable conflict between mortgage law [i.e., that which pertains to recording interests in real
property] and the Anti-Eviction Act.").
204 See Sonderman v. Remington Const., Inc., 127 N.J. 96, 108, 603 A.2d 1, 7
(1992) (explaining that courts deviate from maintaining the integrity of New
Jersey's Recording Act only in rare cases); see also Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80
N.J. 446, 453, 404 A.2d 21, 25 (1979) (stating that col'rts will decide title questions
in a manner that upholds the integrity of New Jersey's recording system, "absent
any unusual equity") (emphasis added).
205 See Hensel, supra note 15, at 324 (arguing that permitting tenants to remain in
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to mortgagees would give tenants a superior right to possess the
leasehold, despite the recordation and priority of the mortgagee's security interest. 20 6 Mortgagees could argue that such a result clashes with New Jersey courts' strict adherence to the
Recording Act in deciding record title problems.20 7
New Jersey courts, however, have recognized a narrow exception to strict adherence to the Recording Act where fairness
and justice demand. 20 ' Although courts usually acknowledge this
exception in cases involving fraud,20 9 foreclosure-related evictions, in which tenants are evicted through no fault of their own,
are also amenable to an application of this "compelling equity"
exception. 210 Accordingly, NewJersey's courts should apply this

exception to foreclosure-related evictions and allow residential
possession despite the prior recordation of the mortgagee's mortgage is in complete derogation of New Jersey's Recording Act).
206 See id. at 323-24 (explaining that tenants' remaining in possession after the
landlord's default on a mortgage would be inconsistent with NewJersey's recording
act policy of according priority to a first-in-time recorded interest in property).
207 See, e.g., Palamarg Realty Co., 80 N.J. at 453, 404 A.2d at 25 ("Generally
speaking, and absent any unusual equity, a court should decide a question of title
...in the way that will best support and maintain the integrity of the recording
system"). An oft-quoted law review article offers perhaps the best explanation of
the policies underlying New Jersey's Recording Act:
An historical study of the Act, as well as an analysis of the cases interpreting it, leads to the conclusion that it was designed to compel the
recording of instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose of
permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title and to purchase
and hold title to lands within this state with confidence. The means by
which the compulsion to record is accomplished is by favoring a recording purchaser, both by empowering him to divest a former nonrecording title owner and by preventing a subsequent purchaser from
divesting him of title. This ability to deprive a prior and bona fide
purchaser for value of his property shows a genuine favoritism toward
a recording purchaser. It is a clear mandate that the recording purchaser. be given every consideration permitted by the law, including
all favorable presumptions of law and fact. It is likewise a clear expression that a purchaser be able to rely upon the record title.
Donald B. Jones, The New Jersey Recording Act-A Study of its Policy, 12 RurGERS L.
REV. 328, 329-30 (1958).
208 See Sonderman, 127 N.J. at 108, 603 A.2d at 7 ("As important as is the confidence of title searchers, purchasers, and others who rely on recorded instruments,
the integrity of record title in rare cases can bend to accommodate compelling equities") (citation omitted).
209 See Hylan v. Kirkman, 204 N.J. Super. 345, 374, 498 A.2d 1278, 1293 (Ch.
Div. 1985) (setting aside recorded documents where fraud was involved); Berman
v. Gurwicz, 178 N.J. Super. 611, 621-23, 429 A.2d 1084, 1090-91 (Ch. Div. 1981)
(prohibiting reliance on recorded instruments where fraud was involved).
210 Sonderman, 127 N.J. at 108, 603 A.2d at 7 (stating that "the integrity of record
title in rare cases can bend to accommodate compelling equities") (citation
omitted).
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tenants to remain in possession despite the prior recordation of
the mortgagee's interest. 2 l ' This result would be fair and just to
both the tenants and the foreclosing mortgagee, whose chances
of maximum return on the security may even be enhanced by
tenants remaining in possession.21 2
The rising tide of foreclosure-related evictions in New Jersey
should also persuade the state judiciary to apply the exception.21 3
This exception's application would be particularly appropriate in
light of the amended Anti-Eviction Act's ability to mitigate any
unfairness to foreclosing mortgagees resulting from tenants remaining in possession.2t 4
D.

Policy and Business Concerns

New Jersey courts may also refuse to subject foreclosing
mortgagees to the amended Anti-Eviction Act, in the absence of
explicit authorization from the legislature, fearing mortgagees'
adverse reactions. 215 The Guttenberg court's similar concerns
were not unfounded: several years after the Guttenberg decision,
Washington D.C. subjected foreclosing mortgagees to that jurisdiction's anti-eviction legislation. 216 This application resulted in
at least one lender completely pulling out of the jurisdiction and
refusing to make any further mortgage loans. 1 7
211 But see Hensel, supra note 15, at 324 (asserting that tenants' remaining in possession after landlords' default on a mortgage, despite the prior recordation of the
mortgagee's mortgage, would be "in complete derogation of the recording act policy that a first-in-time interest in realty has priority").
212 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing the last clause of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987), the amendment to New Jersey's AntiEviction Act, which enables the defaulting mortgagor's successor to renegotiate the
mortgagor's tenants' leases).
213 See Rosin, supra note 2, at 588 (illustrating the dramatic increase in foreclosure-related evictions that is presently taking place in New Jersey).
214 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (explaining that the last clause
of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.3 (West 1987) of the 1986 amendment to New
Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act will permit the defaulting mortgagor's successor to renegotiate the mortgagor's leases, thus enabling the successor to set rents that reflect
market value).
215 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 631-33, 428 A.2d at 1297-98 (referring to the potential long term consequences of subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to the unamended Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints on eviction). The Guttenberg
court was heavily influenced by the predictions of amici curiae which forecast that
mortgage funding for residential apartment buildings would dry up in New Jersey if
foreclosing mortgagees are subjected to good cause restraints on foreclosure-related evictions). Id.
216 Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1169-70 (D.C.
App. 1985). See supra note 154 for a full discussion of the Valentine decision.
217 See Baione, supra note 154, at 1134 n.10 (explaining that two months after the
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The mortgagee banks' reluctance to become involved in running apartment buildings creates additional problems. 2 8 Furthermore, the costs of renegotiating leases with a defaulting
mortgagor's former tenants, or bringing legal action against tenants refusing to negotiate, may either diminish the property's
foreclosure value or create an impenetrable cloud on the property, thus rendering it unsalable. 1 9 In this scenario, if subjected
to the Anti-Eviction Act's eviction-for-cause restraints, mortgagees presently conducting business in New Jersey may choose to
follow the bank that refused to do business in Washington
D.C.2 2 ° Thus, while the amended Act indicates that tenants are
to be accorded the broadest possible protections, the practical
effect of including foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's good
cause restraints may significantly hinder mortgage funding in
New Jersey. 2 2 '
When considering the bare possibility of a decrease in mortgage funding in light of the amended Act's operational effect and
interpretive guidelines, however, the fears that mortgage funds
will dry up should diminish considerably.2 2 2 Indeed, the
amended Act's ability to preserve and, in some cases, enhance
the value of mortgagees' security, as noted above, may render
Valentine decision, a Maryland banking institution ended its practice of making
mortgage loans in Washington, D.C.).
218 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 632, 428 A.2d at 1297 (relying upon amicus Applied
Housing Associates' suggestion that banks do not want to become involved in the
rental housing business in finding that the unamended Anti-Eviction Act should not
be applied to foreclosure-related evictions).
219 See id. at 631-32, 428 A.2d at 1297 (noting that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) may refuse to insure mortgages if mortgaged property cannot be
delivered in vacant condition after foreclosure); see also Baione, supra note 154, at
1147-48 (commenting that the Valentine court overlooked the possibility that subjecting mortgage insurers to anti-eviction legislation may result in a depletion of
available mortgage funding).
220 See Baione, supra note 154, at 1134 n.10 (illustrating the potential adverse
effects of subjecting foreclosing mortgagees to anti-eviction legislation, the author
pointed out that a lending institution completely pulled out of the mortgage lending market in Washington D.C. after the Valentine court held anti-eviction legislation to be applicable to foreclosure-related evictions).
221 Compare Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 631-33, 428 A.2d at 1297-98 (addressing the
possibility that an inclusion of foreclosing mortgagees within the Anti-Eviction
Act's scope would result in decrease of available mortgage funding) with Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1170 & n.9 (D.C. 1985) (per
curiam) (finding no reason to distinguish between mortgage insurers and landlords
or owners for the purposes of applying anti-eviction legislation) and Baione, supra
note 166, at 1134 n. 10 (explaining that the Valentine decision has resulted in at least
one bank's withdrawal from the mortgage lending market in Washington, D.C.).
222 See supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text for an analysis of the 1986
amendatory provisions to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act.
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mortgagees' concerns illusory.2 23
Because of the renegotiability of leases and the concomitant
elimination of overhead costs in obtaining new tenants, tenants
remaining in possession after foreclosure should increase the
value of the building sold at a foreclosure sale. 2 2" Therefore, the
possibility that the property's value will decrease, however probable, would probably not precipitate judicial concern that mortgagees will stop lending in New Jersey. 225 Furthermore,
although courts should avoid judicial legislation,226 courts also
should not ignore the New Jersey Legislature's directive that the
amended Act be liberally construed.227 This consideration is particularly important in light of the fact that foreclosing mortgagees have become one of New Jersey's top evictors. 2 28 These

circumstances clearly warrant an inclusion of foreclosing mortgagees within the amended Anti-Eviction Act's good cause restraints, despite a possible decrease in mortgage funding in New
Jersey. 229
223 See Act of Oct. 29, 1986, ch. 138, § 7, 1986 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 41 (West);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-61.3; Cornelio, supra note 9, at 369 (noting that incoming
rents would preserve property value); supra notes 148-51 (detailing the operative
effect of the 1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act and illustrating
that defaulting mortgagors' successors could offer new leases to the predecessor's
tenants, thus enabling the successor to set market rents).
224 See id; supra notes 148-51 & 193-94 (discussing the "escape" provision of the
1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act, wherein mortgagors' successors will be able to renegotiate their predecessor's leases so as to reflect market
value).
225 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 631-33, 428 A.2d at 1297-98 (applying the unamended Act prohibiting re-negotiation of leases and noting that mortgagees may
stop lending in New Jersey if subjected to good cause restraints on foreclosurerelated evictions and emphasizing the unfairness of binding mortgagees to defaulting mortgagors' potentially disadvantageous leases). The amended Act, however,
accommodates mortgagees' interests by providing a mechanism whereby the foreclosing mortgagee may avoid disadvantageous leases and possibly increase the
value of the mortgaged property by raising tenants' rents to reflect market value.
See supra notes 148-51 & 193-94 for a discussion of the "escape" provisions of the
1986 amendment to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act. As a result, it appears that
many of the Guttenberg court's overriding concerns have largely disappeared.
226 See Guttenberg, 85 N.J. at 627-28, 428 A.2d at 1295 (warning that courts should
not distort legislative intent by applying legislation to unintended subjects) (citations omitted).
227 See supra note 145 and accompanying text for a discussion of the liberal construction clause added to the Anti-Eviction Act in 1986.
228 See Rosin, supra note 2, at 588 (illustrating the dramatic increase in the
number of foreclosure-related evictions that is currently taking place in New
Jersey).
229 See Cornelio, supra note 9, at 372 (asserting that the purposes of anti-eviction
legislation can be best met by including foreclosing mortgagees within the legislation's good cause restraints on eviction).
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CONCLUSION

As amended, New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act fails to expressly include foreclosing mortgagees within its good cause restraints on evicting residential tenants.2 30 Given this failure,
foreclosing mortgagees have at their disposal several potent arguments for a strict interpretation of the amendment and an affirmation of the principles espoused by the Guttenberg court. The
analysis contained herein suggests some reasons why these arguments should fail. Even thus, the long term effect of subjecting
foreclosing mortgagees to the Anti-Eviction Act, coupled with
the New Jersey State Legislature's failure to expressly modify
mortgagees' common law rights could lead courts to reject the
analyses contained herein.2 3 '
Nevertheless, this Comment has raised some issues that will
bear upon New Jersey courts' interpretation of the amended
Anti-Eviction Act. The analysis suggests that the legislation can
be applied to foreclosing mortgagees to protect both mortgagees' rights to security for mortgagors' debts and residential tenants' paramount need for housing. As noted above, the Act's
scope has been expanded beyond traditional landlord-tenant relationships and now provides a mechanism to balance mortgagees' rights to security against residential tenants' need for
housing. In addition, the state legislature has mandated that the
amendment is to be liberally construed.2 3 2 In light of the current
rash of foreclosure-related tenant evictions, these changes and
additions to New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act offer persuasive evidence that mortgagees should be included within the Act's good
cause restraints on eviction.
James E. Tonrey Jr.
230 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 261 N.J. Super. 428, 439-40, 619
A.2d 241, 247 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that the amendment's failure to explicitly
address mortgagees or mortgagees' traditional common law rights manifested a
legislative intent to not include mortgagees within the scope of the amended AntiEviction Act), certif. granted, No. A-4052/6391-91 (April 6, 1993).
231 See id. at 439-40, 619 A.2d at 247 (rejecting an interpretation of the amended
Act that would have included foreclosing mortgagees within the Act's good cause
restraints on eviction because the New Jersey State Legislature failed to explicitly
include, or even mention, foreclosing mortgagees within the language or legislative
history of the Act).
232 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (detailing the New Jersey State Legislature's addition of the liberal construction clause to the Anti-Eviction Act in
1986).

